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TAKING CARE OF JOHN MARSHALL’S POLITICAL GHOST 
MICHAEL P. VAN ALSTINE* 
“The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and 
its sole representative with foreign nations.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
These words of then-Congressman John Marshall may be his most famous 
from a time when he was not sitting as the Chief Justice of the United States.  
Marshall delivered them in an 1800 speech in Congress in defense of President 
John Adams.  The occasion for the defense was an opposition attack on Adams 
for “a dangerous interference of the Executive with Judicial decisions” in the 
extradition of an alleged murderer.2 
One might assume that a speech by a single Congressman in the midst of a 
partisan political dispute would be a strange place to search for constitutional 
granite.  But this has not deterred modern advocates of expansive presidential 
power.  Indeed, enthusiasts have leveraged segments of Marshall’s “sole 
organ” speech to support all manner of executive branch causes, from 
warrantless domestic surveillance of potential enemies, to detaining even 
United States citizens as “enemy combatants,” and even to deferential views 
on prior restraint of publications and on nationalizing domestic industries in 
support of an undeclared war. 
My goal in this work is to set John Marshall’s 1800 speech in a fuller, 
richer context.  Scholars have addressed at length elsewhere a number of 
broader claims of executive power in foreign affairs based, among others, on 
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 1. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800) [hereinafter ANNALS] (statement of Rep. Marshall on 
Mar. 7, 1800). 
 2. Id. at 619. 
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the Vesting Clause of Article II.3  But my focus here is on the curiously 
enduring nature of Marshall’s “sole organ” speech in these and other 
examinations of presidential power.  For even at a distance of two centuries, 
Marshall’s defense of President Adams seems to reemerge whenever 
supporters of a strong Executive look for friends in the founding generation.  
As I will explain below, however, a detached examination of the limited nature 
of Adams’s actions as well as of the political environment for and structure of 
Marshall’s speech should give significant pause about extrapolation beyond the 
narrow dispute that occasioned it. 
Part I begins by setting a simple background for the modern uses—or as I 
will suggest, misuses—of Marshall’s “sole organ” rhetoric.  It will suffice at 
that point to provide only a short summary of the legal dispute that later 
mushroomed into a national political controversy.  The principal purpose of 
Part I is to review the quite remarkable array of substantive executive powers 
Marshall’s speech has been used to justify.  In the course of doing so, we will 
also see that these modern applications have come with generous infusions of 
motivation and intention into a two-hundred-year-old mind. 
Part II then turns to the legal and political context.  John Marshall rose in 
Congress to defend President Adams’s involvement in a case of extradition 
pursuant to the terms of a specific treaty.  We will see there, first, that Adams’s 
cautious and deferential actions left little need for an expansive exposition on 
presidential power.  The same is true of the political context.  Part II will 
explain that, with a Republican opposition casting Adams as an unreformed 
monarchist in impending national elections, the political incentives militated in 
favor of painting executive power with a narrow brush.  As a result, as readers 
confront ambiguity and seek to divine purpose in Marshall’s speech, context 
would seem to caution modesty and restraint in application to modern 
controversies. 
With this foundation, Part III examines Marshall’s full speech in detail.  
Careful analysis reveals that Marshall focused his defense of President Adams 
on the specific treaty provision at issue.  In doing so, he also explicitly 
excluded from executive power those treaties that provide for individual rights 
or defenses or for which the Legislative Branch has prescribed a specific mode 
or agency of execution.  As the political context might predict, in short, 
Marshall’s speech did not endorse a broad theory of executive power even on 
the execution of all treaties.  What is left is expansive-sounding rhetoric about 
presidential authority to resolve issues of “political law” without judicial 
intervention.4  But as Part III also will explain, behind this rhetoric is merely 
 
 3. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and 
Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545 (2004); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, 
The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001). 
 4. See infra notes 217–21 and accompanying text. 
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the concept of a circumscribed, self-executing government power founded in 
law, but one that is also subject to ultimate judicial review.  Such a concept is 
neither unusual nor constitutionally problematic. 
Compelling stories, especially those that culminate in compelling 
speeches, deserve an enduring moral.  In March 1800, revolutionary war 
veteran, statesman, and short-term Congressman John Marshall—and of course 
also the future Chief Justice of the United States—rose in Congress to defend 
presidential involvement in a case that resulted in the extradition and 
subsequent prompt execution of an unfortunate soul.  Marshall’s florid and 
sometimes elliptical language in this defense has led executive branch 
enthusiasts as well as at least one otherwise quite careful scholar to conclude 
that Marshall’s speech endorses an “extraordinary theory of Executive 
power.”5 
My point here is that, when properly understood in its legal and political 
context, the speech is not so extraordinary at all.  In other words, closer 
examination reveals that this episode in the history of the United States is 
better understood as political, not constitutional, in nature. 
I.  CHANNELING THE GHOST OF CONGRESSMAN JOHN MARSHALL 
A review of modern controversies over executive power in foreign affairs 
reveals that Congressman John Marshall’s 1800 speech has something of the 
quality of an eternal polymorph.  Even at substantial distances of time and 
circumstance, we find it shaped and applied for all manner of executive branch 
causes.  And indeed, when excised from context, an advocate of even modest 
talents would have little difficulty summoning important messages from 
carefully selected passages. 
This Part will examine the recurrent modern attempts to channel the ghost 
of John Marshall in the form of the 1800 defender of President John Adams.  
Although the events that gave rise to Marshall’s speech have been exhaustively 
chronicled,6 context has typically played little if any role in such efforts.  It 
will suffice for our purposes at this point, therefore, to provide only a brief 
background.7 
 
 5. Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Robbins, 100 YALE L.J. 
229, 234 (1990). 
 6. See id. at 229–333; Larry D. Cress, The Jonathan Robbins Incident: Extradition and the 
Separation of Powers in the Adams Administration, 111 ESSEX INST. HIST. COLLECTIONS 99 
(1975).  For a detailed analysis of the proceedings in Congress and in particular of Marshall’s 
speech, see Gale Lee Richards, A Criticism of the Public Speaking of John Marshall Prior to 
1801, at 292–351 (Aug. 1950) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa) (on file with 
the State University of Iowa Library). 
 7. Part II below provides a more complete examination of the context for John Marshall’s 
speech. 
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A. The Superficial Story of John Marshall’s “Sole Organ” Speech 
Our story begins in February 1799 with the seemingly prosaic event of the 
arrest of a British sailor in Charleston, South Carolina.  The unusual aspect of 
the case, however, was that the arrest came at the instigation of British 
authorities,8 who asserted that the sailor was complicit in a mutiny and murder 
on a British warship eight years earlier.9  Those authorities also asserted that, 
although the prisoner claimed the name Jonathan (or Nathan) Robbins, his real 
identity was that of an Irishman named Thomas Nash.10  The specific ground 
for the arrest also was significant.  For under the 27th Article of a 
controversial—thus far for other reasons11—1794 Treaty, the United States had 
engaged with Great Britain to extradite all persons “charged with murder or 
forgery committed within the jurisdiction” of the offended state.12 
The judge presiding over the case, Federal District Judge Thomas Bee, 
initially refused a request by the British consul to deliver Nash pursuant to the 
Treaty.13  Following informal correspondence—about which more later14—
British authorities then made a formal request to Secretary of State Timothy 
Pickering that President John Adams order the release of Nash to their 
custody.15  With Adams’s cautious approval, Pickering communicated the 
President’s “advice and request” to Judge Bee that the prisoner “may be 
delivered up” to British authorities under the terms of the Treaty.16  In 
response, Judge Bee informed Pickering that he would order the delivery of 
Nash “[i]n compliance with the request of the President.”17 
 
 8. See Cress, supra note 6, at 100. 
 9. See United States v. Robins [sic], 27 F. Cas. 825, 826 (D.S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175). 
 10. Id. at 826, 837 n.1. 
 11. See infra notes 106–12 and accompanying text. 
 12. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. XXVII, Nov. 19, 1794, 
8 Stat. 116 [hereinafter Treaty of Amity]. 
 13. Cress, supra note 6, at 100–01; see also Letter from Timothy Pickering to John Adams 
(May 15, 1799), microformed on Adams Papers, Letters Received and Other Loose Papers, roll 
394, at 219–219a (Mass. Historical Soc’y microfilm edition) [hereinafter Adams Letters 
Received] (stating that notwithstanding a request by British authorities “the district judge had not 
deemed it proper to deliver him up”). 
 14. See infra notes 72–77 and accompanying text. 
 15. See Note from Robert Liston to Timothy Pickering (May 23, 1799), in 4 STATE PAPERS 
AND PUBLICK DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 303–04 (2d ed., Boston, T.B. Wait & Sons 
1817) [hereinafter STATE PAPERS] (stating a request that Pickering “lay this matter before the 
President, and procure his orders that the said Thomas Nash be delivered up to justice”); see also 
ANNALS, supra note 1, at 516 (reproducing the note). 
 16. Letter from Timothy Pickering to Judge Bee (June 3, 1799), in STATE PAPERS, supra 
note 15, at 304.  The full text of this letter is set forth infra note 78. 
 17. Letter from Thomas Bee to Timothy Pickering (July 1, 1799), in STATE PAPERS, supra 
note 15, at 305; see also ANNALS, supra note 1, at 516–17 (reproducing the letter). 
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At this point, however, this seemingly ordinary legal matter came to the 
attention of political partisans at the national level.  Republican lawyers 
opposed to the Federalist Adams first took up Nash’s defense in the habeas 
corpus proceedings and advanced a broadside of challenges against Adams’s 
action and the Treaty itself.18  They also raised a surprise claim that Nash 
actually was a United States citizen who had been forcibly impressed into 
British service.19  Ultimately, following a full hearing, Judge Bee, highly 
skeptical of Nash’s new factual claim,20 concluded in July 1799 that the 
request for extradition of Thomas Nash (aka Jonathan Robbins) satisfied all of 
the factual and legal predicates of the 27th Article of the 1794 Treaty.21  Nash 
was then delivered to British authorities,22 subsequently tried by court martial, 
and executed.23 
In the charged political environment of the times, the legal case of 
“Jonathan Robbins” then moved fully to the national political stage.24  
Republicans in the House of Representatives first demanded that President 
Adams provide all documents relevant to the arrest and delivery of 
Nash/Robbins to the British.25  Adams complied only three days later.26  House 
Republicans nonetheless put before the body a formal resolution to condemn 
 
 18. See United States v. Robins [sic], 27 F. Cas. 825, 827–29 (D.S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175). 
 19. Id. at 827. 
 20. Id. at 832 (“It is somewhat remarkable, that a man of the name of Jonathan Robbins, 
with the paper produced in his possession, should continue on board a British frigate for a length 
of time, under another name, and acting as a warrant officer, which impressed men are not likely 
to be entrusted with, and that he should afterwards take the name of Nathan Robbins, and lay in 
jail here five or six months, without the circumstance being made known until now.”); see 
Wedgwood, supra note 5, at 295 (concluding that Nash’s counsel “failed to develop factually 
why one should credit [his] late-in-the-day claim of citizenship”); see also id. at 295–99 
(examining the arguments of Robbins’s new counsel in detail as support for this conclusion).  
Documents supplied by the Department of State to Congress at the time also cast serious doubt on 
Nash’s surprise claim of American citizenship.  See Report of the Department of State, Items 4–6 
(Feb. 6, 1800), in STATE PAPERS, supra note 15, at 302, 305–07. 
 21. Robins, 27 F. Cas. at 831–33. 
 22. Id. at 833. 
 23. See Letter from Hyde Parker to Robert Liston (Sept. 9, 1799), in STATE PAPERS, supra 
note 15, at 306 (stating that Nash had been “tried at a court martial, and sentenced to suffer death, 
. . . which sentence has been put into execution”); see also ANNALS, supra note 1, at 517 
(reproducing the letter); id. at 618 (confirming in a formal resolution that Nash had been “tried by 
a court martial and executed”). 
 24. See infra Part II.B. 
 25. ANNALS, supra note 1, at 511–12 (requesting that the President provide to the House all 
documents “relative to . . . the apprehension and delivering of Jonathan Robbins, under the 
twenty-seventh article” of the 1794 Treaty). 
 26. See Message from the President to the House of Representatives (Feb. 7, 1800), in 
STATE PAPERS, supra note 15, at 302 (transmitting the requested report from the Department of 
State to the House of Representatives); see also ANNALS, supra note 1, at 515 (reproducing the 
President’s Message). 
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the President for “a dangerous interference of the Executive with Judicial 
decisions” through his “advice and request” to Judge Bee.27 
It was in this context that first-term Congressman John Marshall rose in the 
House of Representatives to defend Adams’s actions.  In an extended speech, 
Marshall carefully explained why the extradition of Thomas Nash on a charge 
of murder on a British warship “was completely within the letter and the spirit 
of the twenty-seventh article of the treaty between the two nations.”28  It has 
been Marshall’s rhetoric on the execution of the Treaty by the President, 
however, that has attracted the special attention of later generations of 
executive power advocates.  In keeping with the practice of such advocates, at 
this point I will present Marshall’s words with only limited commentary. 
Let us begin with what is easily the most quoted passage: “The President,” 
Marshall opined, “is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and 
its sole representative with foreign nations.”29  But the following sentences 
seem to go even further: “He possesses the whole Executive power,” Marshall 
declared.30  “He holds and directs the force of the nation.  Of consequence, any 
act to be performed by the force of the nation is to be performed through 
him.”31 
The immediately succeeding passages then connect this executive power 
with the execution of treaties.  Marshall reasoned that because a treaty is law, 
the nation’s chief executive officer is obligated to enforce it: The President, he 
stated, “is charged to execute the laws.  A treaty is declared to be a law.  He 
must then execute a treaty, where he, and he alone, possesses the means of 
executing it.”32 
This seemingly holds true even if Congress has not yet implemented the 
treaty at issue: 
The treaty, which is a law, enjoins the performance of a particular object.  The 
person who is to perform this object is marked out by the Constitution, since 
the person is named who conducts the foreign intercourse, and is to take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed.  The means by which it is to be performed, 
the force of the nation, are in the hands of this person.  Ought not this person to 
perform the object, although the particular mode of using the means has not 
been prescribed?  Congress, unquestionably, may prescribe the mode, and 
Congress may devolve on others the whole execution of the contract; but, till 
 
 27. ANNALS, supra note 1, at 532–33 (resolution by Rep. Livingston on Feb. 20, 1800). 
 28. Id. at 605 (statement of Rep. Marshall on Mar. 7, 1800). 
 29. Id. at 613. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. ANNALS, supra note 1, at 613 (statement of Rep. Marshall on Mar. 7, 1800). 
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this be done, it seems the duty of the Executive department to execute the 
contract by any means it possesses.33 
Recounted in this simple way, it would appear that through these words 
Congressman Marshall was staking out a broad constitutional field for 
executive power.  It should thus not surprise that supporters of a strong 
Executive Branch have seized on select passages to support a whole variety of 
claimed presidential powers. 
B. The Recurrent Revivals of Congressman John Marshall’s Speech 
From a legal perspective, Congressman John Marshall’s speech of 1800 
rested in near total peace for well over a century.34  Then, in 1936 Justice 
Sutherland plucked the single “sole organ” sentence from Marshall’s speech as 
part of a broader discourse on national, and in particular presidential, power in 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.35  In specific, Sutherland cited 
the passage in dicta for the following proposition: 
In th[e] vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and 
manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a 
representative of the nation.  He makes treaties with the advice and consent of 
the Senate; but he alone negotiates.  Into the field of negotiation the Senate 
cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.36 
Curtiss-Wright itself did not involve an exercise of independent executive 
power, but rather whether more latitude was appropriate for congressional 
delegations to the President in the field of foreign affairs.37  With expansive 
rhetoric, Sutherland argued that this was indeed the case.  For in this domain, 
 
 33. Id. at 613–14. 
 34. There are two noteworthy exceptions.  Late in the nineteenth century, some Supreme 
Court justices opined—in a losing effort—that executive intercession in extradition is 
constitutionally required and that, therefore, a federal statute permitting initial arrest under a 
treaty on the authority of a court and at the request of a foreign state was unconstitutional.  See In 
re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, 137–38 (1852) (Nelson, J., dissenting) (citing Marshall’s 
defense of President Adams); id. at 148 (Taney, C.J., dissenting); id. at 148 (Daniel, J., 
dissenting).  In the 1893 case of Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), Justice 
Gray cited Marshall’s “masterly and conclusive argument” for the proposition that a federal 
statute or treaty may “submit the decision of questions, not necessarily of judicial cognizance, 
either to the final determination of executive officers, or to the decision of such officers in the 
first instance, with such opportunity for judicial review of their action as Congress may see fit to 
authorize or permit.”  Id. at 714. 
 35. 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (citing ANNALS, supra note 1, at 613 (statement of Rep. 
Marshall on Mar. 7, 1800)). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 315.  This issue was then timely, because in the previous year the Supreme Court 
had struck down two federal statutes for violation of the non-delegation doctrine.  See A.L.A. 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 
U.S. 388 (1935). 
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the delegation works in tandem with “the very delicate, plenary and exclusive 
power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field 
of international relations—a power which does not require as a basis for its 
exercise an act of Congress.”38 
The foundations of Sutherland’s opinion in history, political theory, and 
constitutional interpretation have been subject to substantial scholarly analysis, 
much of it critical.39  Though intensely interesting, this broader issue is beyond 
the scope of our task here.  What is significant for present purposes is that 
Justice Sutherland’s quotation of John Marshall served to rejuvenate interest in 
both the speech itself and in the version he refiltered in Curtiss-Wright.  Or to 
be more precise, Justice Sutherland’s selective use of John Marshall the 
Congressman propelled a newfound practice of wringing constitutional 
significance from individual passages in Marshall’s now two-centuries-old 
speech. 
We will have space here only to highlight some of the more expansive of 
these efforts.  Not surprisingly, executive branch officials—including of course 
from the Bush Administration—have been among the most opportunistic of 
this group.  In 2001, for example, the Office of Legal Counsel relied on 
segments of Marshall’s speech as support for a presidential power to conduct 
unilateral military operations.40  Citing the statements that the “President is the 
sole organ of the nation in its external relations” and that he “is entrusted with 
the whole foreign intercourse of the nation,” the Office reasoned that 
“depriving the President of the power to decide when to use military force 
would disrupt the basic constitutional framework of foreign relations.”41 
Executive administrations have likewise cited the “sole organ” proposition 
as reinvigorated by Curtiss-Wright for a variety of other propositions.  
Included among these are that the President has the authority to conduct 
warrantless surveillance of potential enemies within the United States;42 to 
 
 38. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320. 
 39. See, e.g., David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice 
Sutherland’s Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946); Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1 (1973); Michael D. 
Ramsey, The Myth of Extraconstitutional Foreign Affairs Power, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 379 
(2000); see also HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING 
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 94 (1990) (reviewing the “withering criticism” of 
Justice Sutherland’s opinion in Curtiss-Wright). 
 40. John C. Yoo, Memorandum Opinion for the Deputy Counsel to the President re: The 
President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists and 
Nations Supporting Them (Sept. 25, 2001), in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU 
GHRAIB 3 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005). 
 41. Id. at 9. 
 42. See Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the 
Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President, at 1 (Jan. 19, 2006), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf (“The NSA activities 
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transform a decision of the International Court of Justice into domestic law;43 
to preempt state laws that could interfere with a sole executive agreement;44 to 
detain United States citizens captured in the United States as “enemy 
combatants”;45 to require dismissal of private claims under the Alien Tort 
Statute;46 and to disregard as unconstitutional a statute that would limit the 
ability to issue more than one official passport to government personnel.47 
 
are supported by the President’s well-recognized inherent constitutional authority as Commander 
in Chief and sole organ for the Nation in foreign affairs to conduct warrantless surveillance of 
enemy forces for intelligence purposes to detect and disrupt armed attacks on the United States.”).  
To the same effect, see Wartime Executive Power and the National Security Agency’s 
Surveillance Authority: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 264–319 
(Feb. 6, 2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_hr/nsasurv.pdf (setting forth 
the prepared statement of Alberto Gonzales, U.S. Att’y Gen.).  For an examination of the issues 
that surround this surveillance program, see David Cole & Martin S. Lederman, The National 
Security Agency’s Domestic Spying Program: Framing the Debate, 81 IND. L.J. 1355 (2006). 
 43. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 40–41, 
Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (No. 04-5928) (citing the President’s status as “‘the sole 
organ of the federal government in the field of international relations’” together with the United 
Nations Charter for an executive authority to “determine[] that the foreign policy interests of the 
United States justify compliance with the ICJ’s decision” (quoting Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 
320)). 
 44. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 14, Am. Ins. 
Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (No. 02-722) (“California has thereby thrust itself into 
the field of foreign relations and foreign commerce that is reserved exclusively to Congress and 
the President, who ‘is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole 
representative with foreign nations.’” (quoting Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319 (quoting 
statement of John Marshall))). 
 45. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari app. at 156, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) 
(No. 03-1027) (“The order [under review] arises in the context of foreign relations and national 
security, where a court’s deference to the political branches of our national government is 
considerable.  It is the President who wields ‘delicate, plenary and exclusive power . . . as the sole 
organ of the federal government in the field of international relations—a power which does not 
require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 282 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320))). 
 46. Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae at 20–21, Doe v. Unocal Corp., 
395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628) (“The Supreme Court has long 
recognized that the Constitution commits ‘the entire control of international relations’ to the 
political Branches.  It is the ‘plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the 
federal government in the field of international relations’ to decide the ‘important complicated, 
delicate and manifold problems’ of foreign relations.  Because the Constitution has so committed 
the power over foreign affairs, the Supreme Court has strongly cautioned the courts against 
intruding upon the President’s exercise of that authority.” (citations omitted) (quoting Fong Yue 
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893) and Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319–20)). 
 47. Timothy E. Flanigan, Memorandum Opinion for the Counsel to the President re: Issues 
Raised by Provisions Directing Issuance of Official or Diplomatic Passports (Jan. 17, 1992), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/gray.11.htm. 
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But spirited uses of select passages from Marshall’s speech have also come 
from Justices of the Supreme Court.  To begin with the most recent, consider 
Justice Clarence Thomas’s selective quotation of Marshall in Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld as support for an independent executive power to detain citizens as 
“enemy combatants.”48  There, Thomas argued that “[t]he Founders” intended 
to delegate to the President primary responsibility over national security and 
foreign affairs “principally because the structural advantages of a unitary 
Executive are essential in these domains.”49  In a remarkable feat of historical 
clairvoyance, Thomas then asserted that it was “[a]lso for these reasons” that 
Marshall described the President as “the sole organ of the nation in its external 
relations.”50 
A line of cases on “sole executive agreements” also traces its foundation to 
Marshall’s “sole organ” concept as rejuvenated in Curtiss-Wright.  Perhaps not 
surprisingly, Justice Sutherland himself began this line in 1937 in United 
States v. Belmont.51  There, he reasoned that incident to the President’s 
“authority to speak as the sole organ” of the country in recognizing foreign 
governments was also a power to settle related private claims.52  Carrying 
forward a controversy still very much alive, the Supreme Court has since 
reaffirmed this holding on three principal occasions,53 although it signaled a 
more limited course this past term.54 
Then-Justice William Rehnquist likewise sought in the 1970s to invoke the 
ghost of Congressman John Marshall to argue that ex-Presidents had a 
constitutional right to control their public papers on separation of powers 
 
 48. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 579 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 49. Id. at 580. 
 50. Id. at 581 (“Also for these reasons, John Marshall explained that ‘[t]he President is the 
sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.’” 
(quoting ANNALS, supra note 1, at 613 (statement of Rep. Marshall on Mar. 7, 1800))). 
 51. 301 U.S. 324 (1937). 
 52. Id. at 330 (“[I]n respect of what was done here, the Executive had authority to speak as 
the sole organ of th[e national] government.”). 
 53. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (holding that an implied element 
of a sole executive agreement on the settlement of World War II-era claims preempted a 
California statute requiring disclosure of information on certain insurance policies related to the 
Holocaust); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (citing the “sole organ” concept and 
concluding that the President had the authority to establish a binding claims settlement procedure 
incident to a resolution of an international crisis); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942) 
(holding that the “[p]ower to remove such obstacles to full recognition [of a foreign government] 
as settlement of claims of our nationals certainly is a modest implied power of the President who 
is the ‘sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations’” (citation 
omitted) (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936))). 
 54. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1371–72 (2008). 
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grounds.55  Justice Harlan’s opinion in New York Times Co. v. United States56 
relied on a similar extrapolation.  In an opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger 
and Justice Blackmun, Harlan cited Marshall’s “sole organ” statement as 
support for a deferential view on the power of the President to restrain the New 
York Times from publishing certain documents alleged to contain national 
security information.57 
But Justice Vinson’s dissenting opinion in Youngstown reflects perhaps the 
broadest reading of Marshall’s defense of President Adams in the 
Nash/Robbins affair.58  In an opinion joined by Justices Reed and Minton, 
Vinson cited President Adams’s actions as an example of “the leadership 
contemplated by the Framers” in which Presidents have “dealt with national 
emergencies . . . to save [legislative] programs until Congress could act.”59  As 
support for this proposition, Vinson quoted at length Marshall’s 1800 
observation—which I have reproduced in full above60—that, although 
Congress “unquestionably may prescribe the mode” for the execution of a 
treaty, “till this be done, it seems the duty of the Executive department to 
execute the contract by any means it possesses.”61  Noting that a later Supreme 
Court described Marshall’s argument as “masterly and conclusive,”62 Vinson 
reasoned that this and similar historical events justified President Truman’s 
seizure of steel mills to support the undeclared Korean War.63 
My purpose in describing the above uses of Marshall’s 1800 speech is not 
to engage with the ultimate legal conclusions in those specific disputes.  It is, 
rather, to show how much and how often later advocates have been willing to 
 
 55. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 545 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  
Citing Curtiss-Wright’s revival of Marshall’s “sole organ” concept, Rehnquist argued that the 
need for executive branch confidentiality “is particularly true in the area of foreign affairs and 
international relations.”  Id. at 551 n.6 (citing Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319). 
 56. 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
 57. Id. at 756 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  “It is plain to me,” Harlan argued, “that the scope of 
the judicial function in passing upon the activities of the Executive Branch of the Government in 
the field of foreign affairs is very narrowly restricted.”  Id.  After quoting Marshall’s “sole organ” 
phrase, id., Harlan concluded that “[f]rom that time, shortly after the founding of the Nation, to 
this, there has been no substantial challenge to this description of the scope of executive power,” 
id. (citing Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319–21). 
 58. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 667 (1952) (Vinson, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 59. Id. at 683. 
 60. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 61. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 684 (quoting ANNALS, supra note 1, at 596, 613–14 (statement 
of Rep. Marshall on Mar. 7, 1800)). 
 62. Id. at 685 (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 714 (1893)). 
 63. Id. at 700 (concluding after a “cursory summary of executive leadership” that it “amply 
demonstrates that Presidents have taken prompt action to enforce the laws and protect the country 
whether or not Congress happened to provide in advance for the particular method of execution”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
104 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:93 
infuse meaning to Marshall’s words and attribute purpose to his actions almost 
without reference to their context.  But context matters.  And as we shall see 
below, Marshall’s specific defense of a cautious presidential action under a 
specific extradition treaty in its specific political context should give 
substantial pause about extrapolation to any broader constitutional themes.64 
II.  SETTING THE BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
A. The Legal Context: The Limited Need to Defend President Adams’s 
Limited Action 
In this Part, I will attempt—in the limited space here allowed—to set 
Marshall’s “sole organ” speech in a richer context.65  Let us first return to the 
limited role of President John Adams in the sad story of Thomas Nash.  Recall 
that the presiding judge in the case, Thomas Bee, refused the initial request of 
British authorities to deliver up Nash under the 1794 Treaty.66  By its express 
text, the extradition provision of the Treaty—the 27th Article—failed to 
prescribe the precise modalities of delivery.  It provided only that “the United 
States” had agreed with the King of Great Britain to extradite the covered 
fugitives.67  In absence of express guidance, Judge Bee originally believed that 
a federal statute governing internal, state-to-state extraditions made this “a 
matter for the executive interference.”68 
Beyond this omission, the 27th Article set forth both legal and factual 
predicates for extradition.  First, the parties engaged to extradite, upon a formal 
 
 64. Martin Flaherty has provided the definitive explanation of the need for caution in the 
application of history to law.  See Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, 
Original Understanding, and Treaties as “Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 
(1999); Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. 
REV. 523 (1995). 
 65. I am indebted to Sanaz S. Mirzaei, doctoral candidate in the Department of Government 
and Politics at the University of Maryland at College Park, for the foundation provided here by 
her excellent historical and political research. 
 66. See supra notes 8–23 and accompanying text. 
 67. Treaty of Amity, supra note 12, art. XXVII (providing that “[i]t is further agreed, that his 
Majesty and the United States, on mutual requisitions, by them respectively, or by their respective 
ministers or officers authorized to make the same, will deliver up to justice” the covered persons). 
 68. See United States v. Robins [sic], 27 F. Cas. 824, 833 (D.S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175) 
(stating Judge Bee’s opinion that “[w]hen application was first made, I thought this a matter for 
the executive interference” on the ground of the federal state-to-state extradition statute); see also 
Note from Robert Liston to Timothy Pickering (May 23, 1799), in STATE PAPERS, supra note 15, 
at 303 (“[O]n the application of the consul for the restoration of Nash, in conformity to the treaty 
of 1794, judge Bee, and the federal attorney, were of opinion that he could not with propriety be 
delivered up without a previous requisition on my part made to the executive government of the 
United States.”). 
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request, those fugitives “charged with murder or forgery.”69  Second, the 
crimes must also have occurred “within the jurisdiction” of the offended 
state.70  Finally, in language clearly protective of the accused, the 27th Article 
provided that extradition was permitted “only . . . on such evidence of 
criminality, as, according to the laws of the place, where the fugitive or person 
so charged shall be found, would justify his apprehension and commitment for 
trial, if the offence had there been committed.”71 
Judge Bee’s initial apprehensions about applying this treaty provision 
without further guidance led to a chain of communication from the British 
consul in Charleston to the British minister in Philadelphia and then to 
Secretary of State Timothy Pickering.72  On the basis of the British inquiry, 
Pickering wrote to Adams on May 15, 1799 to offer his advice.73  Drawing a 
distinction from an earlier case involving the same mutiny but a U.S. citizen 
prisoner,74 Pickering urged that Judge Bee “should be directed to deliver up” 
Nash under the Treaty “on the demand of the British Government, by its 
minister.”75 
President Adams, however, was substantially more cautious about 
interfering in a judicial proceeding.  In specific, he replied to Pickering on May 
21, 1799 that he was uncertain about the Executive’s authority to give an order 
to a federal judge.  “How far the president of the U.S. would be justifiable in 
directing the judge, to deliver up the offender,” he wrote to Pickering, “is not 
clear.”76  Adams instead opted for a mere “advice and request” to Judge Bee on 
the extradition of Nash under the Treaty.77 
 
 69. See Treaty of Amity, supra note 12, art. XXVII. 
 70. Id.  The latter jurisdictional language assumed great significance in the debate in 
Congress over President Adams’s actions.  See infra notes 172–75 and accompanying text.  
Marshall likewise addressed the issue at length.  See ANNALS, supra note 1, at 597–605 
(statement of Rep. Marshall on Mar. 7, 1800).  Other than as proof that Robbins’s extradition fell 
within the scope of the Treaty, however, the specifics of this jurisdictional dispute are not of 
direct interest for our examination of Marshall’s statements about executive power. 
 71. Treaty of Amity, supra note 12, art. XXVII. 
 72. See Cress, supra note 6, at 100–01; see also Note from Robert Liston to Timothy 
Pickering (May 23, 1799), in STATE PAPERS, supra note 15, at 303–04. 
 73. Letter from Timothy Pickering to John Adams (May 15, 1799), microformed on Adams 
Letters Received, supra note 13, at 219–219a. 
 74. See Wedgwood, supra note 5, at 235–38, 268–86. 
 75. Letter from Timothy Pickering to John Adams (May 15, 1799), microformed on Adams 
Letters Received, supra note 13, at 219–219a. 
 76. Letter from John Adams to Timothy Pickering (May 21, 1799), microformed on Adams 
Papers, Letterbook, roll 119 (Mass. Historical Soc’y microfilm edition). 
 77. Id. (instructing Pickering that “I have no objection to advize and request” the judge 
regarding the extradition of Nash). 
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Pickering dutifully communicated President Adams’s cautious approach on 
executive authority in the determinative letter to Judge Bee twelve days later.78  
Much in the nature of a legal brief to a court, the letter relayed Adams’s views 
on the satisfaction of the requirements for extradition set forth in the 27th 
Article of the 1794 Treaty.  It first informed Judge Bee that British authorities 
had made the required formal request for extradition.79  On the understanding 
that Nash had been charged with a covered crime (murder) on a British 
warship on the high seas, the letter then conveyed Adams’s opinion that the 
legal predicate for extradition—a crime committed “within the jurisdiction” of 
Great Britain—had been satisfied.80  With reference to this legal element, 
therefore, the letter offered the view that Nash “ought to be delivered up.”81 
Beyond this, the decision on the application of the Treaty to the case of 
Thomas Nash was left to Judge Bee.82  This is true with particular emphasis for 
the factual predicate protective of the accused.  On this issue, Pickering merely 
repeated—verbatim, and without editorial—the Treaty’s requirement that 
sufficient “evidence of . . . criminality be produced” as would justify arrest and 
trial under domestic law.83  (Interestingly, in the copy of this letter that Adams 
 
 78. Letter from Timothy Pickering to Thomas Bee (June 3, 1799), in STATE PAPERS, supra 
note 15, at 304.  Given its importance, the full text of this letter is set forth below: 
  Sir,—Mr. Liston, the minister of his Britannick majesty, has requested, that Thomas 
Nash, who was a seaman on board the British frigate Hermione, and who he is informed is 
now a prisoner in the jail of Charleston, should be delivered up.  I have stated the matter 
to the President of the United States.  He considers an offence committed on board a 
publick ship of war, on the high seas, to have been committed within the jurisdiction of 
the nation to whom the ship belongs.  Nash, is charged, it is understood, with piracy and 
murder, committed by him, on board the above mentioned British frigate, on the high 
seas, and consequently ‘within the jurisdiction’ of his Britannick majesty; and therefore, 
by the 27th article of the treaty of amity with Great Britain, Nash ought to be delivered 
up, as requested by the British Minister, provided such evidence of his criminality be 
produced, as by the laws of the United States, or of South Carolina, would justify his 
apprehension and commitment for trial, if the offence had been committed within the 
jurisdiction of the United States.  The President has in consequence hereof authorized me 
to communicate to you ‘his advice and request,’ that Thomas Nash may be delivered up to 
the consul or other agent of Great Britain, who shall appear to receive him. 
Id. 
 79. Id.  The British minister in Philadelphia had made a formal request for extradition in late 
May.  See Note from Robert Liston to Timothy Pickering (May 23, 1799), in STATE PAPERS, 
supra note 15, at 303–04. 
 80. Letter from Timothy Pickering to Thomas Bee (June 3, 1799), in STATE PAPERS, supra 
note 15, at 304 (stating that President Adams “considers” a murder in such circumstances to be 
one covered by the extradition provision). 
 81. Id. 
 82. See Cress, supra note 6, at 103 (stating after a review of Pickering’s letter that “[t]he 
final decision in the case, then, was left fully in the hands of the judiciary”). 
 83. Letter from Timothy Pickering to Thomas Bee (June 3, 1799), in STATE PAPERS, supra 
note 15, at 304. 
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transmitted to Congress in advance of Marshall’s 1800 speech, this evidentiary 
condition is reproduced with emphasis.84  Emphasis likewise was added to 
similar language in a later letter from Judge Bee to Pickering upon production 
of a copy to Congress.85) 
Pickering’s letter to Judge Bee then closes with a direct quote of Adams’s 
cautious “advice and request.”  “[I]n consequence” of the opinions set forth in 
the letter, Pickering concludes, “[t]he President has . . . authorized me to 
communicate to you ‘his advice and request’ that Thomas Nash may be 
delivered up to” British authorities.86 
Even Ruth Wedgwood—who has attempted to wring enduring significance 
from Marshall’s later speech87—concludes that in this affair President Adams 
“was surprisingly delicate concerning the Executive’s relation to a judge.”88  
His approach, rather, reflected “caution” on whether he had the constitutional 
authority “to direct the judge” on the application of the Treaty.89  In other 
words, with a mere “request,” Adams couched his communication to Judge 
Bee in the “language of deference.”90 
The written record of the subsequent judicial proceedings likewise gives 
no indication that Pickering’s letter on behalf of President Adams had any 
greater effect than deferential “advice” coupled with a conditional “request.”  
Judge Bee in his formal opinion makes no mention of the letter at all;91 the 
 
 84. Compare Report of the Department of State, Item No. 2 (Feb. 6, 1800) (reproducing 
Letter from Timothy Pickering to Thomas Bee (June 3, 1799)), in STATE PAPERS, supra note 15, 
at 302, 304, with ANNALS, supra note 1, at 516 (reproducing the letter without this emphasis). 
 85. Compare Report of the Department of State, Item No. 3 (Feb. 6, 1800) (reproducing 
Letter from Thomas Bee to Timothy Pickering (July 1, 1799)), in STATE PAPERS, supra note 15, 
at 302, 305 (stating that the judge had ordered delivery of Nash “on such strong evidence of his 
criminality as justified his apprehension and commitment for trial” (emphasis in version 
forwarded to Congress)), with ANNALS, supra note 1, at 516–17 (reproducing the letter without 
this emphasis). 
 86. Letter from Timothy Pickering to Thomas Bee (June 3, 1799), in STATE PAPERS, supra 
note 15, at 304. 
 87. See infra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 88. Wedgwood, supra note 5, at 290.  Wedgwood elsewhere likewise acknowledges that for 
Adams the Nash/Robbins affair “was a small matter, dispatched almost routinely in the press of 
other business.”  Id. at 309. 
 89. Id. at 290. 
 90. See id. at 292 n.246 (concluding that, with a mere “request,” Pickering’s letter to Judge 
Bee on behalf of President Adams and his later letter to British Minister Robert Liston “used the 
same language of deference” (citing Letter from Timothy Pickering to Robert Liston (June 4, 
1799), microformed on Domestic Letters of the Dep’t of State, 1784–1906 (National Archives 
Microfilm Publication))). 
 91. Shortly before his death in 1812, friends of Judge Bee published a volume of his 
opinions that also included a new version of his memorandum order in the Robbins case.  This 
later version includes a reference to the “request” of President Adams.  See REPORTS OF CASES 
ADJUDGED IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH CAROLINA BY THE HON. THOMAS BEE 266 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
108 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:93 
only reference comes in introductory comments, presumably by a clerk.92  
Rather, Judge Bee’s opinion sets forth an independent examination and 
decision on each of the predicates for extradition set forth in the 27th Article.  
He first reversed his initial view that a federal statute on domestic, state-to-
state extraditions required executive involvement in this case as well.93  He 
instead concluded—in a view only rejected by the Supreme Court four decades 
later94—that the reference in Article III of the Constitution to cases “arising 
under . . . treaties”95 provides a self-executing foundation for jurisdiction by 
the lower federal courts.96 
But perhaps the most telling information comes from the personal pronoun 
Judge Bee uses at the end of his substantive analysis of the Treaty.  After 
addressing a variety of challenges to both the Treaty and its application, Judge 
Bee concludes solely in the first person singular.  This is particularly important 
on the protective factual predicate that Pickering’s letter had left entirely for 
Bee to decide: 
I have carefully reviewed the arguments advanced by the counsel for the 
prisoner.  I have looked into the constitution, the treaty, the laws, and the cases 
quoted: and upon a full investigation of them all, I am of opinion, that from the 
affidavits filed with the clerk of the court, there is sufficient evidence of 
criminality to justify the apprehension and commitment of the prisoner for 
trial, for murder committed on board a ship of war belonging to his Britannic 
majesty, on the high seas . . . .97 
With these conclusions, and a formal extradition request by British 
authorities under the 27th Article of the Treaty, Judge Bee declared that his 
obligation as a judge was clear: “I am bound by the express words of that 
 
(Phila., William P. Farrand & Co. 1810)  (stating that Robbins was delivered to the British “in 
consideration of the circumstances, and at the particular request of the president of the United 
States [Mr. John Adams]” (alteration in original)). 
 92. United States v. Robins [sic], 27 F. Cas. 825, 826–27 (D.S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175) 
(stating that “[t]he judge had received a letter . . . from the secretary of state . . . containing these 
words—The president ‘advises and requests’ you to deliver him up”). 
 93. Id. at 833.  The Judiciary Act of 1789 did not address the subject of extradition. 
 94. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850) (“Courts created by statute can 
have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.”). 
 95. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 96. Robins, 27 F. Cas. at 833 (“[A]s the law and the treaty are silent upon the subject, 
recurrence must be had to the general powers vested in the judiciary by law and the constitution, 
the 3d article of which declares the judicial power shall extend to treaties, by express words.”).  In 
1848, Congress passed a law specifically authorizing judges to act on the foundation of 
extradition requests without first securing authorization from the President.  See Act of Aug. 12, 
1848, ch. 167, 9 Stat. 302; see also In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103 (1852) (upholding the act 
against a claim that it unconstitutionally encroached on executive power). 
 97. Robins, 27 F. Cas. at 833 (emphasis added). 
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clause of the treaty, to deliver [Nash] up to justice.”98  His formal order in the 
District Court Minute Book likewise simply “command[s]” that the marshal 
deliver Nash to the British because “the 27th Article of the Treaty of Amity etc. 
was binding in the Present instance.”99 
There was, in short, from a legal perspective little for John Marshall to 
defend when Adams’s actions became the subject of later Republican attacks.  
Through Pickering, Adams merely expressed an opinion on the interpretation 
of the Treaty.  Separately, he conveyed an executive “request” and approval 
that, upon satisfactory proof as required by the Treaty, Judge Bee may deliver 
the prisoner directly to British authorities.100  We shall see that this direct, 
formal connection with a foreign state will assume significance for Marshall’s 
speech—indeed, in my reading, that is one essential foundation for his 
reasoning.101  But as we turn to Marshall’s formal defense of Adams’s 
involvement in the Nash affair, we should keep firmly in mind that Adams did 
not claim an authority to control the domestic interpretation and application of 
the Treaty, and from the written record at least, the judge in the case did not 
recognize any such authority. 
The (in)significance of Adams’s actions becomes even clearer if, as 
executive advocates would have it, we view them through a modern lens.  
There is nothing even noteworthy today about the Executive Branch offering 
its interpretive views on treaties; indeed, conventional Supreme Court 
precedent sanctions the practice.102  It is equally well established that the 
Executive Branch has the “ultimate” authority over formal extradition to a 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. See Order, United States v. Nathan Robbins Alias Thomas Nash, U.S. District Court for 
South Carolina (July 26, 1799), microformed on Minutes, Circuit and District Courts, District of 
South Carolina, 1789–1849, roll 1, M1181 (National Archives Microfilm Publication). 
 100. See Letter from Timothy Pickering to Thomas Bee (June 3, 1799), in STATE PAPERS, 
supra note 15, at 304 (communicating President Adams’s “request” that Thomas Nash “may” be 
delivered to British authorities). 
 101. See infra Part III.D.1. 
 102. See, e.g., El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 168 (1999) (stating 
that “[r]espect is ordinarily due the reasonable views of the Executive Branch concerning the 
meaning of an international treaty”); O’Connor v. United States, 479 U.S. 27, 33 (1986) 
(observing that executive branch interpretations of treaties are “entitled to great weight”); 
Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184–85 (1982) (same).  For a more 
limited view of the appropriate deference to executive views, see Michael P. Van Alstine, The 
Death of Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudence and a Call for Resurrection, 93 GEO. L.J. 1885, 
1944 (2005) (arguing that “courts should afford only calibrated deference to the views of the 
executive branch” depending on “the degree to which an issue affects foreign affairs and whether 
the continuing administration of the treaty at issue is expressly entrusted to a specific executive 
branch agency” (footnote omitted)). 
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foreign state, even where a court has found the treaty predicates satisfied.103  In 
short, if a modern president were to take the actions taken by John Adams in 
1799, it would barely occasion comment. 
To be sure, legal issues that seem clear today may have been quite 
unsettled then.  With only grainy understandings of the new constitutional 
institutions created a decade before, one can well imagine that even the simple 
act of an Executive communicating his views to a judge could occasion 
political controversy.  In fact, as we shall see immediately below, the 
Republican opposition soon seized on the Thomas Nash affair to attack 
President Adams in the run-up to the presidential elections of 1800.  But as the 
next section also will explain, that political context provided no incentive for 
John Marshall to extend his defense beyond Adams’s cautious approach to 
executive power—and indeed the incentives ran directly to the contrary. 
B. Marshall’s Speech in Political Context 
1. The General Background 
The speech of Congressman John Marshall in March 1800 arose in the 
wash of substantial political uncertainty and consequent political opportunism.  
The basic facts of the Nash/Robbins affair in the backdrop of the speech have 
been extensively studied by historians104 and the limited space permitted for 
this work precludes full elaboration here.  We cannot in any event transport 
ourselves to fully understand the contemporary environment or to apprehend 
the tone and inflection of the sensibilities of the time.  My goal here, rather, is 
to sketch the basic contours of the political background, with the hope of 
thereby better appreciating the likely motivations for and limitations on 
Marshall’s speech. 
We shall start with some broad reminders.  The events of early 1800 
unfolded as the national political system increasingly coalesced around two 
distinct political movements.  In the early 1790s, the personal prestige of 
President George Washington and his general policy of international neutrality 
had provided a basic stability to the constitutional office of the President.  But 
as he receded from national affairs at the end of a second term, political 
 
 103. See In re Extradition of Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1325 (1st Cir. 1993).  For a 
comprehensive review of this and related principles of modern extradition law, see John T. Parry, 
The Lost History of International Extradition Litigation, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 93, 150–51 (2002) 
(concluding that “[t]oday, the ability of the executive branch to reject the results of the [judicial] 
extradition hearing is taken for granted”). 
 104. See, e.g., 2 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL: POLITICIAN, 
DIPLOMATIST, STATESMAN 1789–1801, at 458–75 (1916); FRANCES HOWELL RUDKO, JOHN 
MARSHALL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: STATESMAN AND CHIEF JUSTICE 86–92 (1991); JAMES 
F. SIMON, WHAT KIND OF NATION: THOMAS JEFFERSON, JOHN MARSHALL, AND THE EPIC 
STRUGGLE TO CREATE A UNITED STATES (2002). 
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interests increasingly diverged into pro-central government Federalists 
associated with John Adams and Alexander Hamilton and anti-central 
government Republicans associated with Thomas Jefferson.105 
A principal event that gave momentum to this trend and (for reasons 
described below106) is worthy of special mention here is the controversy that 
arose around the so-called Jay Treaty—for its chief negotiator John Jay—of 
1794.107  Later “Federalists” saw this Treaty of “Amity, Commerce and 
Navigation” with Great Britain as a means of solidifying commercial 
relationships and of avoiding war with that leading maritime power of the 
day.108  Later “Republicans” in contrast, ideologically sympathetic to 
revolutionary France, viewed the Treaty as a betrayal of an established friend 
in favor of the aristocratic, moneyed interests of an established enemy.109  
Republican opposition in Congress and elsewhere led to excited debates over 
executive power, the role of the Senate in treaty making, and the 
responsibilities of the House in implementation.110  Notwithstanding the 
considerable controversy, the Jay Treaty ultimately was ratified and 
implemented under the influence of President Washington’s prestige.111  But as 
one historian has observed, “[t]he idea of a unified, national government that 
 
 105. See generally DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, THE REVOLUTION OF AMERICAN 
CONSERVATISM: THE FEDERALIST PARTY IN THE ERA OF JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY (1965); 
LINDA K. KERBER, FEDERALISTS IN DISSENT: IMAGERY AND IDEOLOGY IN JEFFERSONIAN 
AMERICA (1970). 
 106. See infra notes 122–34 and accompanying text. 
 107. Treaty of Amity, supra note 12.  For broader historical reviews of the controversy 
surrounding the Jay Treaty, see JERALD A. COMBS, THE JAY TREATY: POLITICAL 
BATTLEGROUND OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS (1970); STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, 
THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 415–49 (1993); Todd Estes, Shaping the Politics of Public Opinion: 
Federalists and the Jay Treaty Debate, 20 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 393 (2000). 
 108. See REGINALD HORSMAN, THE NEW REPUBLIC: THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
1789–1815, at 48–51 (2000); BERNARD A. WEISBERGER, AMERICA AFIRE: JEFFERSON, ADAMS, 
AND THE REVOLUTIONARY ELECTION OF 1800, at 150–54 (2000). 
 109. See HORSMAN, supra note 108, at 48 (observing that to Republicans Jefferson and 
Madison, adoption of the Jay Treaty “meant deserting the old ally France, . . . enhancing the 
moneyed interests, and presenting a threat to the independent republicanism they desired”); Keith 
Arbour, Benjamin Franklin as Weird Sister: William Cobbett and Federalist Philadelphia’s 
Fears of Democracy, in FEDERALISTS RECONSIDERED 179, 186 (Doron Ben-Atar & Barbara B. 
Oberg eds., 1998) (observing that to the Republican opposition “in 1795 the Jay Treaty . . . 
seemed a frighteningly plain step toward the ultimate aristocratic goal”). 
 110. See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 107, at 415–26, 441–49; Wedgwood, supra note 
5, at 261–68. 
 111. See LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON AND THE 
FOUNDING OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 532 n.48 (1995) (observing that the Federalist position 
prevailed on the Jay Treaty debate because of “Washington’s timing of critical actions and by the 
president’s great skill in using his unparalleled prestige to influence public opinion”); Estes, 
supra note 107, at 417. 
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had been weakening since at least 1791 collapsed in the aftermath of Jay’s 
agreement with Great Britain.”112 
The domestic conflict over international allegiances only intensified in the 
first years of the Presidency of John Adams.  Notably displeased with the 
growing American affinity with Great Britain, revolutionary France seized 
close to three hundred American ships in a “quasi-war” in the late 1790s.113  In 
an effort to end the hostilities, President Adams sent a diplomatic delegation—
which included John Marshall—to meet with French foreign minister Charles 
Talleyrand, but the delegation was met with affronts and requests for bribes.114  
Marshall’s principled refusal to negotiate in such circumstances had a 
substantial effect on his public standing and on that of the Federalists in 
general.115 
Upon his return from France, therefore, Marshall was elected to Congress 
in 1799 as a representative of Virginia.116  Influenced by experiences in the 
Revolutionary Army and the state legislature,117 Marshall had by that time 
already expressed—as a delegate to the Virginia ratifying convention for the 
new Constitution, for instance118—clear sentiments in favor of a strong 
centralized government.  Marshall thus quickly became aligned with Federalist 
 
 112. HORSMAN, supra note 108, at 51; see also ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 107, at 
415 (observing that it has “long been understood” that “[t]he outpouring of popular feeling over 
the Jay Treaty . . . was more directly responsible than anything else for the full emergence of 
political parties in America, and of clearly recognized Federalist and Republican points of view 
on all political questions”); Estes, supra note 107, at 393 (observing that in addition to its role in 
diplomatic history “[s]cholars usually have portrayed the [Jay Treaty] debate . . . as an event that 
hastened the formation of the first political parties by deepening and clarifying allegiances on 
both sides”). 
 113. See RUDKO, supra note 104, at 47–48; see also ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 107, 
at 537–38; HORSMAN, supra note 108, at 51; Estes, supra note 107, at 402–05. 
 114. For a broad review of this “XYZ Affair,” see ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 107, at 
537–79; RUDKO, supra note 104, at 48–49. 
 115. See RUDKO, supra note 104, at 48–50; SIMON, supra note 104, at 44–45. 
 116. See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 107, at 558–59; RUDKO, supra note 104, at 83.  
Marshall did so with the urging of George Washington.  See Letter from George Washington to 
John Marshall (Dec. 30, 1798), in 37 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE 
ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES, 1745–1799, at 75, 76 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940). 
 117. See HORSMAN, supra note 108, at 133; see also RUDKO, supra note 104, at 2 (observing 
that experience in the Virginia state legislature “critically shaped Marshall’s views” in favor of a 
strong central government); Martin S. Flaherty, Byron White, Federalism, and the “Greatest 
Generation(s),” 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1573, 1594 (2003) (examining a similar point about 
Marshall’s war experiences (citing LEONARD BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE IN LAW 34–56 
(1974))). 
 118. See 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 222–36 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., J.B. Lippincott Co. 1907) (1836) 
(statement of John Marshall on June 10, 1788); RUDKO, supra note 104, at 2 (observing that 
“Marshall, already impressed by the need for a strong national government, energetically 
advocated the adoption of the Constitution”). 
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interests in Congress.  Indeed, as a former diplomat on behalf of the 
Administration, Marshall “[r]epresent[ed] an important link between President 
Adams and House Federalists.”119 
2. The Nash/Robbins Affair is Transformed into an Issue of National 
Electoral Politics 
With this general context of increasingly divided and partisan national 
politics, let us return now to the role of the Nash/Robbins affair.  Two 
ingredients in this affair combined to create a particularly combustible brew 
amid the conflict between the pro-national, pro-British Federalists and the pro-
local, anti-British (though now less pro-French120) Republicans.  First, and 
foremost, Nash’s extradition and execution in the summer of 1799 unfolded in 
the shadow of the first presidential election seriously contested along party 
lines.121  Adding fuel was the legal ground for the delivery of Nash to the 
British: The authority for extradition on which President Adams and Judge Bee 
relied was found in Article 27 of the very same Jay Treaty that had provoked 
so much controversy four years earlier.122 
The result was a recipe for political profiteering.  News of the extradition 
of Nash in July 1799 spread rapidly among newspapers and pamphleteers, the 
principal mode of political discourse at the time.123  As one historian has 
observed, “Republican editors rekindled public dislike for the Jay Treaty with 
solemn editorials citing Article 27 as typical of Federalist treachery and 
cooperation with Great Britain at the expense of the American citizenry.”124  
To cite just one example, a leading Republican newspaper of the time, the 
Philadelphia Aurora, declared with reference to the Nash/Robbins affair that 
“BRITISH INFLUENCE threatens destruction to these States!”125  By October 
 
 119. See Cress, supra note 6, at 113; see also EDWARD S. CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND 
THE CONSTITUTION: A CHRONICLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 50 (1919). 
 120. In November 1799, Napoleon Bonaparte overthrew the revolutionary government of 
France and established the French empire.  Reliable news of the coup d’état reached the United 
States in February 1800.  Interestingly, although the impact is hard to triangulate, this is just as 
the controversy was beginning in Congress that led to John Marshall’s speech.  See EDWARD J. 
LARSON, A MAGNIFICENT CATASTROPHE: THE TUMULTUOUS ELECTION OF 1800, AMERICA’S 
FIRST PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 67 (2007). 
 121. See id. at 67–86; JAMES ROGER SHARP, AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 
226–49 (1993). 
 122. See supra notes 106–12 and accompanying text. 
 123. See Cress, supra note 6, at 106–07. 
 124. See id. at 106 & n.22 (citing articles on the Nash/Robbins affair in July and August 1799, 
in the Charleston City Gazette and Daily Advertiser, the Richmond Examiner, the Baltimore 
American, and the Newark, New Jersey Centinel of Freedom).  For a more focused review of 
these attacks in Republican newspapers on the foundation of the Nash/Robbins affair, see 
DONALD H. STEWART, THE OPPOSITION PRESS OF THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 242–47 (1969). 
 125. John Smith, AURORA GEN. ADVERTISER, Aug. 12, 1799, at 2. 
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1799, Thomas Jefferson—with perhaps more than a bit of exaggeration—even 
opined in a private letter from Philadelphia that “no one circumstance since the 
establishment of our government has affected the popular mind more.”126 
Throughout the fall of 1799, Republican newspapers continued to fan the 
political flames into a principal theme in the early campaign against Adams for 
the election of 1800.127  A widely reproduced Republican pamphlet thus 
declared that “Robbins” was “ignominiously put to death” on the authority of 
President Adams.128  For its pithy summary, historian Albert Beveridge’s 
description of this Republican effort—in a work on the life of John Marshall 
for which he won the Pulitzer Prize—is worthy of extended quotation here: 
Here was, indeed, a campaign issue.  The land rang with Republican 
denunciation of the President.  What servile truckling to Great Britain!  Nay, 
more, what a crime against the Constitution!  Think of it!  An innocent 
American citizen delivered over to British cruelty.  Where now were our free 
institutions?  When President Adams thus surrendered the Connecticut 
“Yankee,” Robins, he not only prostituted patriotism, showed himself a tool of 
British tyranny, but also usurped the functions of the courts and struck a fatal 
blow at the Constitution.  So shouted Republican orators and with immense 
popular effect.129 
Adams’s actions on the foundation of the Jay Treaty also conveniently 
played into broader Republican themes for the election of 1800.  Building on 
long-standing antipathies,130 the Republicans throughout the campaign sought 
to paint Adams as an unreformed monarchist.  Thus, for example, one 
Republican pamphleteer, citing Adams’s early writings that had expressed 
favorable views on life tenure for presidents,131 declared that he was “a 
 
 126. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Charles Pinckney (Oct. 29, 1799), in 31 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 226, 227 (Barbara B. Oberg ed., 2004). 
 127. See Cress, supra note 6, at 106–10 (describing the newspaper articles in more detail). 
 128. PHILIP FRENEAU, LETTERS ON VARIOUS INTERESTING AND IMPORTANT SUBJECTS 116–
23 (Scholars’ Facsimiles & Reprints 1943) (1799); see Cress, supra note 6, at 108 n.29 (listing 
the newspapers that reprinted Freneau’s letter at the time). 
 129. BEVERIDGE, supra note 104, at 459.  For a similar observation, see SIMON, supra note 
104, at 95 (observing that in the fall of 1799 “[t]he Republicans charged that Robbins’s death had 
been the direct result of the precipitous action of President Adams, whose sympathies for Great 
Britain as well as his own monarchical tendencies had led to his unbridled, and unconstitutional, 
use of executive power”). 
 130. Proto-Republicans had tarred Adams as a monarchist in the election of 1796 as well.  For 
example, partisans distributed pamphlets declaring that “John Adams is an avowed 
MONARCHIST.”  JOHN FERLING, ADAMS VS. JEFFERSON: THE TUMULTUOUS ELECTION OF 
1800, at 90 (2004); see also MANNING J. DAUER, THE ADAMS FEDERALISTS 101 (1953) 
(observing regarding the election of 1796 that it was “certain” that “there was considerable 
danger from the charges of monarchism” leveled against Adams). 
 131. See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 107, at 532–36 (referring to Adams’s Defence of 
the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America and Discourses on Davila); see 
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monarchist . . . [who] speaks with rapture, almost with rhapsody, of the 
hereditary senate and executive.”132  More broadly, the Philadelphia Aurora 
pronounced that Federalism as a whole was “a mask for monarchy.”133  
Ultimately, Republican efforts to mark out Adams as a monarchist became 
“central to their campaign against Adams.”134 
Newly elected Federalist Congressman John Marshall was no detached 
neutral in these events.135  From his own writings, he was well aware at the 
time of the transformation of the Nash/Robbins affair from a legal case into a 
national political issue.  Already in September 1799 (six months before his 
speech in Congress), Marshall joined the public debate in defense of President 
Adams.  In an open letter in the Virginia Federalist attributed to him136 and 
directed to the public at large, Marshall declared that he “wish[ed] to prevent 
the effects . . . upon the minds of those who do not possess the kind of 
information necessary to enable them to judge impartially on the subject.”137  
We will have more to say about this open letter below.138  But the important 
message at this point is that Marshall recognized well in advance of the 
Congressional debates that the attacks on Adams were “calculated to 
exasperate the public mind.”139 
 
also DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 374–79, 421 (2001) (same); id. at 409–10 (noting that 
in his first term as Vice President, “[t]he suspicion that Adams was a monarchist at heart grew 
stronger, and understandably, as in his Defence of the Constitutions of Government, he did seem 
to lean in that direction”). 
 132. See LARSON, supra note 120, at 178. 
 133. AURORA GEN. ADVERTISER, Oct. 14, 1800, at 2. 
 134. LARSON, supra note 120, at 177–78; see also MCCULLOUGH, supra note 131, at 544 
(noting that as the campaigning fully developed later in the summer of 1800, “Adams was 
inevitably excoriated as a monarchist, more British than American”). 
 135. John Marshall, in these pre-Supreme Court days at least, was much more of a political 
player than is generally discussed.  Bruce Ackerman, for one, has observed with reference to the 
later controversies over the election of 1800 that “[c]ontemporary biographers cast Marshall as an 
Olympian demigod, splendidly detached from the fierce struggles going on all round him.  To put 
it mildly, this is an exaggeration.”  BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING 
FATHERS 54 (2005); see also ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 107, at 728 (observing that John 
Marshall “would take a highly active hand in the proceedings that opened in December 1799” 
toward the election of 1800). 
 136. The editor of Marshall’s papers included this letter among Marshall’s formal documents 
on the foundation of later attributions in the early 1800s.  See 4 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 
23 n.4 (Charles T. Cullen ed., 1984) [hereinafter MARSHALL PAPERS] (citing attributions by John 
E. Hall in 1821 and Francis Wharton in 1849). 
 137. Id. at 23. 
 138. See infra notes 227–30 and accompanying text. 
 139. MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 136, at 23. 
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3. The Electioneering Moves to the Congressional Theater 
By the early months of 1800, the electioneering for the impending 
presidential election was already in full swing.140  Perhaps most importantly, 
the state elections for the legislature of New York were scheduled to occur in 
April.141 At that time, the choice of electors for President remained, as 
provided in Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution,142 very much within the 
discretion of the state legislatures.143  This was all the more important because 
in the election of 1796, the New York state legislature itself had awarded the 
state’s twelve electors to Adams in his three-vote victory over Thomas 
Jefferson.144  As a result, the impending April state legislative elections in New 
York—as we shall see, only one month after Marshall’s famous speech—could 
have a direct impact on the election of the President at the end of the year.145 
Not surprisingly, the presidential election became a subject of intense 
partisan interest in Congress as well.  In January 1800, Federalist Senator 
James Ross introduced a bill (which was ultimately unsuccessful) that would 
have effectively transferred control over the coming election to the Federalist-
dominated Senate.146  By early March (only two days before John Marshall’s 
speech), Massachusetts Federalist Congressman Fisher Ames even wrote to a 
 
 140. See MCCULLOUGH, supra note 131, at 534–35.  The election of President became all the 
more significant as the nation lost the stabilizing influence of the person of George Washington, 
who died suddenly on December 14, 1799. 
 141. See FERLING, supra note 130, at 126–31; LARSON, supra note 120, at 94–109; see also 
WEISBERGER, supra note 108, at 238–39 (observing that for Republicans, a victory in the April 
elections in New York “was absolutely indispensible to the further progress of their cause”). 
 142. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“Each state shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature 
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and 
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress . . . .”). 
 143. Indeed, in ten of the sixteen states involved in the election of 1800 the state legislature 
directly chose the electors for President without a separate vote of the electorate.  See SHARP, 
supra note 121, at 243. 
 144. See LARSON, supra note 120, at 30–31; SHARP, supra note 121, at 245. 
 145. That was indeed the case.  See MCCULLOUGH, supra note 131, at 556 (observing that 
with a change of only 250 votes in New York City, Adams would have won the electoral votes of 
New York and thus the election of 1800); see also SHARP, supra note 121, at 244 (stating that the 
ultimate Republican victory in the New York state elections early in 1800 “contributed 
substantially to the demoralization and disintegration of the Federalists and led to considerable 
optimism among the Republicans”). 
 146. The Bill would have created a “Grand Committee” with the authority to decide on the 
qualifications of the individual presidential electors chosen by the states.  See ANNALS, supra 
note 1, at 28–29.  With questions of constitutionality and propriety swirling, Congressman John 
Marshall led the efforts of more moderate Federalists in the House to reform the Bill, but it 
ultimately went nowhere.  See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 107, at 730; LARSON, supra 
note 120, at 78–83; WEISBERGER, supra note 108, at 235–36. 
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confederate that “[o]ur parties in Congress seem to regard th[e] approaching 
election as the only object of attention.”147 
But the “most controversial” issue in Congress was the attempt of 
Republicans in the House to reawaken partisan passions over the 
Nash/Robbins affair.148  Recall that, even though President Adams promptly 
complied with the initial request to turn over all relevant documents,149 in late 
February 1800 House Republicans introduced a formal resolution to condemn 
him for “a dangerous interference of the Executive with Judicial decisions.”150  
(Perhaps not coincidentally, the proponent of this resolution was 
Representative Edward Livingston from New York, where the first significant 
state voting was about to occur.151)  Some Republicans even raised the idea of 
impeachment.152 
House Republicans pursued extended debate on the subject for the next 
two weeks153 with “little purpose beyond partisanship.”154  Indeed, historian 
Albert Beveridge has concluded that “[f]or the purposes of the coming 
presidential campaign . . . the Robins affair was made the principal subject of 
Republican congressional attack on the Administration.”155  This was all the 
more significant because recent moderate moves by Adams (such as on peace 
negotiations with France) minimized the impact of other campaign issues.156 
 
 147. Letter from Fisher Ames to Christopher Gore (Mar. 5, 1800), in 2 WORKS OF FISHER 
AMES 1354, 1355 (W.B. Allen ed., 1983); see also Editorial Note, in MARSHALL PAPERS, supra 
note 136, at 35 (observing that in Congress in the early months of 1800 “[a]ttention, as always, 
was given to public opinion and the upcoming presidential election”). 
 148. See Editorial Note, in MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 136, at 35 (noting that in February 
1800 “the Republicans [in Congress] attempted to revive the matter as a campaign issue”). 
 149. See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text. 
 150. ANNALS, supra note 1, at 532–33 (resolution by Rep. Livingston on Feb. 20, 1800). 
 151. Id.; see also RUDKO, supra note 104, at 87 (“The House began debate on resolutions 
introduced by Edward Livingston, Republican from New York, on February 20, 1800, 
condemning President Adams’s handling of the affair.”). 
 152. ANNALS, supra note 1, at 552 (statement of Rep. Harper on Feb. 26, 1800). 
 153. See id. at 541–78 (detailing the debates from Feb. 25 to Feb. 27, 1800); id. at 583–96 
(detailing the debates from Mar. 3 to Mar. 6, 1800). 
 154. Editorial Note, in MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 136, at 35. 
 155. BEVERIDGE, supra note 104, at 460; see also Richards, supra note 6, at 293 (observing 
that “[t]he Jonathan Robbins case was a deliberate and calculated Republican attempt to discredit 
the [Adams] administration”); id. at 304 (concluding with regard to the Republican attack in 
Congress that “[a] cloud of doubt concerning the integrity and ability of the [Adams] 
administration might aid materially in turning the election tide to Jefferson and his party” and that 
“[e]very member of the House was keenly aware of this fact, and was therefore sensible of the 
political implication which accompanied the outcome of this debate”). 
 156. Cress, supra note 6, at 112 (observing that “[t]he search for an issue with which to 
weaken the appeal of the president’s new policies led Republican leaders to launch a 
congressional investigation of the Robbins affair”). 
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Echoing the claims of allied newspapers throughout the past fall, 
Republican orators in Congress focused their attention on whether “Robbins” 
in fact was an American citizen wrongfully impressed by the British.157  This 
laid the foundation for a return to the theme that, through his “orders” to the 
judge to cede jurisdiction to a foreign state,158 Adams had again demonstrated 
his monarchical preferences.159 
The partisan foundation for these efforts became even clearer when 
Republicans sought to postpone further formal debate until more documents 
could be obtained from the court in South Carolina.160  The obvious purpose of 
this maneuver, as John Marshall himself observed, was to keep the controversy 
alive and thus cast suspicion on “the character of the President of the United 
States . . . until the next session of Congress.”161  Not surprisingly, that session 
was to begin in November, on the eve of the formal election of the 
President.162  Referring again to the political background, Marshall declared 
that “a postponement amounted to a declaration to the people of America that 
there was much cause for suspicion, and that additional evidences were wanted 
to substantiate it.”163 
In short, as he rose to defend President Adams in early March 1800, John 
Marshall must have been fully attentive to the political foundation for the 
Republican attacks.  We need not speculate too greatly on this score, however.  
For Marshall began his speech with a direct statement that his purpose was to 
“rescu[e] public opinion from those numerous prejudices” raised by “so many 
causes” against the Administration.164  And he concluded with a declaration 
 
 157. See ANNALS, supra note 1, at 541–60 (relating substantial debate about the authenticity 
of the related documents); see also RUDKO, supra note 104, at 87 (referring to Nash’s claim that 
he was an impressed American sailor and stating that “Republicans tended to credit his story”). 
 158. See, e.g., ANNALS, supra note 1, at 543 (statement of Rep. Sedgwick on Feb. 25, 1800) 
(stating that the only issue was whether the President had interfered and “whether the Judge had 
been guilty of a breach of his duty in obeying the orders given him by the Executive”). 
 159. See RUDKO, supra note 104, at 87 (stating that in the congressional debates “[t]he 
Republicans were incensed by what they considered an unwarranted exercise of authority by the 
‘monarchical’ Adams”). 
 160. See ANNALS, supra note 1, at 548–77. 
 161. Id. at 577 (statement of Rep. Marshall on Feb. 27, 1800); see also BEVERIDGE, supra 
note 104, at 462–63, 462 n.2 (observing that Marshall “thought this procrastinating maneuver a 
Republican trick to keep the whole matter open until after the coming presidential campaign” and 
that “[t]his, in fact, was the case”); Letter from John Marshall to James Markham Marshall (Feb. 
28, 1800), in MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 136, at 80, 81 (stating with regard to the Republican 
attacks in Congress that “[e]very stratagem seems to be us[e]d to give to this business an undue 
impression”). 
 162. See ANNALS, supra note 1, at 781 (reporting the beginning of a new session of Congress 
on Nov. 17, 1800). 
 163. Id. at 577 (statement of Rep. Marshall on Feb. 26, 1800). 
 164. Id. at 596 (statement of Rep. Marshall on Mar. 7, 1800). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] TAKING CARE OF JOHN MARSHALL’S POLITICAL GHOST 119 
that his long defense of Adams was necessary because the Republican 
resolutions were “so calculated to interest the public feelings.”165  Indeed, 
Marshall concluded in a private letter shortly after his speech that the entire 
debate over the Nash/Robbins affair “was for the purpose principally of 
affecting the next election of President.”166 
With the manifest political motivations behind the attack itself, strong 
incentives would have pushed John Marshall to draw his defense of Adams’s 
involvement in the Nash/Robbins affair as narrowly as possible.  To be sure, in 
a fit of naivety or bravado Marshall could have spurned party and politics to 
stake out some broader theory of executive authority.  But as we turn to 
Marshall’s speech, we must keep in mind that any assertion of such authority 
that went beyond Adams’s cautious approach would have played into the 
Republicans’ political hand, and any unnecessary claim of substantive 
executive power risked substantiating Republican campaign themes of 
monarchism and presidential overreaching.  In other words, any broader claim 
of executive power risked invigorating the very political controversy Marshall 
rose to quell. 
III.  EXAMINING JOHN MARSHALL’S “SOLE ORGAN” SPEECH IN CONTEXT 
We turn now to the speech itself.  As we do so, we must avoid the lawyer’s 
inclination to construct arguments on carefully selected text.  If we instead 
consider the full text in full context, we find an interpretation of John 
Marshall’s speech that is fully consistent with the political incentives that 
pushed against staking out a broad theory of inherent executive power167 by 
way of broad obiter dicta.168 
Indeed, as we shall see below, Marshall does not even found his defense of 
President Adams on a coherent, comprehensive method of constitutional 
 
 165. Id. at 616. 
 166. Letter from John Marshall to Reuben George (Mar. 16, 1800), in MARSHALL PAPERS, 
supra note 136, at 114. 
 167. Others have noted, although without extensive analysis, that in his famous political 
speech Marshall was not making a broad claim about executive power.  See Bradley & Flaherty, 
supra note 3, at 549 n.19 (observing that Marshall’s speech was in defense of a specific action of 
President Adams under a specific treaty and that Marshall “was not making any claim about 
unspecified substantive powers”). 
 168. Although she fails to explain why Marshall would be inclined to disregard the political 
context, this is what Ruth Wedgwood claims.  See Wedgwood, supra note 5, at 293 n.247 
(asserting that “Marshall claimed far stronger power for the Presidency than Adams exercised in 
this correspondence”); see also id. at 351 (stating that “[i]t is striking that Marshall did not defend 
Adams on the narrower facts of his involvement”).  Perhaps tellingly, Professor Wedgwood 
relegates Marshall’s own recognition of the political foundations for the Republican attacks on 
Adams to an afterthought on subsequent events.  See id. at 357; see also supra notes 135–39 and 
164–66 and accompanying text (examining evidence that Marshall was well aware of the political 
context for his speech). 
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interpretation.  At times, he adopts a text-bound approach by adverting to the 
Take Care Clause169 and, more obliquely, the presidential station derived from 
the Receive Ambassadors Clause.170  In other places, he appeals to pragmatic 
and functional considerations arising from the need for faithful and consistent 
representation of national interests in foreign affairs.171  Ultimately, however, 
careful examination reveals that, with a certain appreciation of the 
fundamentally political nature of the entire affair, Marshall’s speech was a 
lawyerly defense of a specific presidential action in a specific dispute under a 
specific treaty. 
A. The Treaty as the Source of Executive Authority in Domestic Law 
From premise and structure Marshall made clear in his 1800 speech that 
the source of executive authority to act in the extradition of Thomas Nash was 
the law created by treaty.  He thus carefully explained how the extradition 
satisfied each and every legal and factual predicate set forth in the Treaty.  He 
founded his argument, first, on the fact that Nash was arrested not for a 
violation of any domestic criminal law of the United States, but rather solely 
“for the purpose of being delivered up to justice in conformity with the treaty” 
between the United States and Great Britain.172 
Marshall then explained at length why, because Nash was a British sailor 
on a British warship in international waters, “jurisdiction” as provided in the 
Treaty was solely British.173  Separately, he asserted that United States courts 
did not have concurrent jurisdiction in such circumstances, both because this 
was not a matter covered by the “Judicial Power” in Article III and because 
background understandings about international law placed limits on the 
prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction of the United States.174  Moreover, he 
emphasized that the arrest of Nash was predicated on a charge of murder as 
 
 169. See ANNALS, supra note 1, at 614 (statement of Rep. Marshall on Mar. 7, 1800) 
(adverting to the President’s duty “to take care that the laws be faithfully executed”); see also 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (providing that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed”). 
 170. See ANNALS, supra note 1, at 614 (statement of Rep. Marshall on Mar. 7, 1800) 
(observing that the Executive Branch is “[t]he department which is entrusted with the whole 
foreign intercourse of the nation”); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (granting to the President the 
power to “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers”). 
 171. See ANNALS, supra note 1, at 614 (statement of Rep. Marshall on Mar. 7, 1800) 
(asserting that because the President is “the person . . . who conducts the foreign intercourse” and 
because in foreign affairs “the force of the nation [is] in the hands” of the President, “[o]ught not 
this person to perform the object” of a treaty in absence of congressional direction?); id. (arguing 
that “[t]he Executive is not only the Constitutional department, but seems to be the proper 
department to which the power in question may most wisely and most safely be confided”). 
 172. Id. at 615. 
 173. See id. at 597–605. 
 174. Id. at 605–12. 
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expressly contemplated in the Treaty, and not on a broader theory of piracy 
(which would have resulted in tangled claims of universal jurisdiction).175 
As Ruth Wedgwood has noted, for modern tastes there is substantial room 
to question Marshall’s jurisdictional arguments.176  These possible flaws of 
logic and principle would seem to undermine the force of Congressman 
Marshall’s speech in general.  In any event, they are peripheral to our purposes 
here.  For the ultimate foundation of Marshall’s defense of executive power in 
the Nash/Robbins affair was the law created by treaty.  In the beginning,177 
middle,178 and end of his speech,179 Marshall emphasized that the extradition 
was “completely within the letter and spirit” of the 27th Article of the 
Treaty.180  Moreover, because Nash was not charged with a crime triable in 
United States courts, Marshall concluded that this “is the precise case in which 
his surrender was stipulated by treaty.”181 
With this foundation Marshall recurs to a simple constitutional syllogism 
to establish the authority of President Adams to act in the matter: Under the 
force of the Take Care Clause the President “is charged to execute the laws”; 
“[a] treaty is declared to be a law”; the President “must then execute [the] 
treaty, where he, and he alone, possesses the means of executing it.”182  Notice, 
significantly, that the foundation of this syllogism is not some free-standing 
executive power to generate law, but rather the default authority—about which 
more below183—of the President to execute the law first established by the 
Treaty. 
 
 175. See id. at 602 (“For the murder, not the piracy, Nash was delivered up.  Murder, and not 
piracy, is comprehended in the 27th article of the treaty between the two nations.”). 
 176. See Wedgwood, supra note 5, at 346 (raising doubts about Marshall’s “inarticulate 
argument” on the finality of judgments by Article III courts and calling into question Marshall’s 
“confabulated argument” about the extraterritorial jurisdiction of Article III courts); id. at 346–47 
(asserting that Marshall’s use of international law as a limit on jurisdiction of courts is “sleight of 
hand”). 
 177. ANNALS, supra note 1, at 597 (statement of Rep. Marshall on Mar. 7, 1800) (stating 
Marshall’s “first proposition . . . that the case of Thomas Nash . . . was completely within the 27th 
article of the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation” between Great Britain and the United 
States). 
 178. Id. at 605 (asserting that it had been “demonstrated . . . that the case [of Thomas Nash] 
was completely within the letter and the spirit of the twenty-seventh article of the treaty”). 
 179. Id. at 616 (concluding that “the case of Thomas Nash, as stated to the President, was 
completely within the twenty-seventh article of the treaty”). 
 180. Id. at 605. 
 181. Id. at 612. 
 182. ANNALS, supra note 1, at 613 (statement of Rep. Marshall on Mar. 7, 1800). 
 183. See infra notes 243–50 and accompanying text. 
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Marshall also expressly denied that any substantive gap existed in the 
Treaty.184  Instead, he analogized the case to a statute and reasoned that “[t]he 
treaty . . . is as obligatory as an act of Congress making the same 
declaration.”185  Thus, just like the background understanding for a statute, the 
President has the authority to carry out the “law” created by the Treaty.186  As 
a matter of emphasis, Marshall also acknowledged that, if a substantive gap 
had existed in the law, the President would not have the authority to fill it.187 
The limited nature of the executive power Marshall described is finally 
revealed by Congress’s power of curtailment.  Marshall declared that, although 
the President may have a default authority to execute treaty law, such authority 
must yield to the legislative powers of Congress.  “Congress, unquestionably, 
may prescribe the mode,” Marshall affirmed.188  Indeed, although the law at 
issue emanated from an international treaty, he asserted that “Congress may 
devolve on others the whole execution of the contract.”189  This congressional 
power of curtailment should alone give executive branch enthusiasts pause in 
expounding on Marshall’s description of executive authority to execute the 
specific treaty at issue there.190 
 
 184. See ANNALS, supra note 1, at 614 (statement of Rep. Marshall on Mar. 7, 1800) (stating 
that “it is not admitted or believed that there is such a total omission in this case”). 
 185. Id. (asking if there were such a statute “could the President, who is bound to execute the 
laws, have justified the refusal to deliver up the criminal, by saying, that the Legislature had 
totally omitted to provide for the case?”). 
 186. In fact, when a bill was later introduced in Congress to implement the 27th Article of the 
Jay Treaty in express terms, Marshall proposed an amendment that would have empowered the 
President to extradite on his decision alone.  See id. at 654 (statement of Rep. Marshall on Apr. 2, 
1800). 
 187. See id. at 614 (declaring that “the Executive cannot supply a total Legislative omission”). 
 188. Id. 
 189. ANNALS, supra note 1, at 614 (statement of Rep. Marshall on Mar. 7, 1800) (emphasis 
added).  Marshall himself put a point on this principle as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court only 
four years later.  In Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804), Marshall authored an opinion 
on the power of the President to contravene an act of Congress that addressed the seizure of 
American vessels on the high seas.  Citing both the Take Care Clause and the President’s status as 
Commander in Chief, Marshall first observed that “[i]t is by no means clear that the president of 
the United States” might not have empowered the seizure “without any special authority for that 
purpose.”  Id. at 177.   He also admitted that “the first bias of my mind was very strong in favour 
of” recognizing presidential authority to do so.  Id. at 179.  “But,” he conceded, “I have been 
convinced that I was mistaken, and I have receded from this first opinion.  I acquiesce in that of 
my brethren, which is, that the instructions cannot change the nature of the transaction, or legalize 
an act which without those instructions would have been a plain trespass.”  Id.  For an analysis of 
the Court’s limitation of executive power in this case, see David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, 
The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 
967–70 (2008).  See also id. at 969–70, 970 n.88 (noting that Marshall’s analysis in Little v. 
Barreme is “perfectly consistent” with his “sole organ” speech in Congress). 
 190. For a broader examination of the power of Congress to curtail executive power, even in 
foreign affairs, see David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the 
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B. A Treaty “of a Very Different Nature”191 
John Marshall did not even make a claim about executive power in the 
enforcement of all treaties.  He explained generally that the case of Thomas 
Nash was “completely within” the extradition provision of the Jay Treaty.192  
But he likewise structured his defense of President Adams with reference to 
the specific circumstances of that specific treaty provision. 
Most important, Marshall made clear that the executive power he was 
describing did not extend to treaties that address the rights of individuals; such 
treaties, he declared, properly fall within the province of the judiciary: “A case 
in law or equity proper for judicial decision may arise under a treaty, where the 
rights of individuals acquired or secured by a treaty are to be asserted or 
defended in court.”193  For illustration, he referred to treaties already then in 
effect that secured the individual rights of foreign citizens in the United States 
as well as a hypothetical treaty provision that would prescribe domestic 
“punishment” instead of external extradition.194 
In the same vein, Marshall expressly affirmed that a treaty itself may 
provide for execution by the courts.  (We might compare here his statement 
that Congress as a whole likewise may “prescribe the mode” for the execution 
of a treaty.195)  Marshall did so by distinguishing an existing consular treaty 
that stipulated performance “through the medium of the courts.”196  The treaty 
provision at issue in the extradition of Thomas Nash, in contrast, was “of a 
very different nature.”197  For, as Marshall frequently emphasized,198 the 27th 
Article of the Jay Treaty contemplated a formal international law act of 
delivery of an accused to a foreign state but did not prescribe the “mode” for 
doing so.199 
 
Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 
689, 743–48 (2008); Barron & Lederman, supra note 189, passim. 
 191. ANNALS, supra note 1, at 608 (statement of Rep. Marshall on Mar. 7, 1800). 
 192. See supra notes 177–81 and accompanying text. 
 193. ANNALS, supra note 1, at 606 (statement of Rep. Marshall on Mar. 7, 1800). 
 194. Id. at 606–07. 
 195. Id. at 614. 
 196. Id. at 608. 
 197. Id.; see also id. at 614 (emphasizing that the Executive properly should be “entrusted” 
with execution of a treaty “like that under consideration”). 
 198. See ANNALS, supra note 1, at 609 (statement of Rep. Marshall on Mar. 7, 1800) 
(contrasting the case of a prize dispute between two individuals and concluding that “[t]he 
demand of a man made by a nation stands on different principles”); id. at 611 (distinguishing a 
domestic criminal prosecution from “a provision for the performance of a national compact for 
the surrender to a foreign Government of an offender against that Government”); id. at 613 
(asserting that the case of Thomas Nash “was in its nature a national demand made upon the 
nation” and concluding that “the demand is not a case for judicial cognizance”). 
 199. Marshall made the same point in his public Virginia Federalist letter.  See Letter to the 
Virginia Federalist (Sept. 7, 1799), in MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 136, at 23, 25 (reasoning 
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C. “The Sufficiency of the Evidence was Submitted Entirely to the Judge”200 
This distinction between individual treaty rights and government treaty 
powers is further illustrated by Marshall’s treatment of the evidentiary 
condition for extradition in the Jay Treaty.  Recall that Secretary of State 
Pickering’s letter to Judge Bee on behalf of President Adams expressly 
reserved this issue for judicial determination (a point emphasized in the version 
of the letter later produced to Congress).201 
Marshall repeatedly stressed this point in his defense of Adams.  As an 
abstract matter, Marshall confirmed that the Treaty permitted extradition only 
“if supported by proof.”202  Therefore, Nash “ought to have been delivered” 
under the Treaty only if “the necessary evidence [of the murder] was 
produced.”203 
As he turned to his defense of Adams’s action in this case, Marshall then 
emphasized that the President left such evidentiary issues for judicial 
determination.  He first observed that Adams, in giving his “advice and 
request,” was not even aware of Nash’s surprise claim of American 
citizenship.204  But Marshall also “defended the conduct of the President on 
[an]other and still stronger ground” that delivery was directed only “if 
satisfactory evidence of the murder should be adduced.”205  Indeed, Marshall 
declared, “[t]he sufficiency of the evidence was submitted entirely to the 
Judge.”206 
Marshall emphasized the same point on the essentially legal question of 
whether Nash had committed the covered crime of “murder.”207  Recall that a 
principal thrust of the Republican attack was that Nash in fact was an 
American sailor who had been impressed by the British.208  Marshall stressed, 
however, that Adams had left this issue as well to judicial determination.209  A 
homicide committed in resisting impressment is justified and therefore is not 
 
that because “[t]he treaty has not pointed out any mode” of execution, the proper department for 
carrying it out was the President).  We will have more to say about this below.  See infra notes 
243–50 and accompanying text. 
 200. ANNALS, supra note 1, at 617 (statement of Rep. Marshall on Mar. 7, 1800). 
 201. See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text. 
 202. ANNALS, supra note 1, at 597 (statement of Rep. Marshall on Mar. 7, 1800). 
 203. Id. at 605. 
 204. Id. at 617. 
 205. Id.; see also id. at 616 (observing that President Adams properly informed the judge that 
Nash ought to be delivered “provided evidence of the fact was adduced”). 
 206. Id. at 617. 
 207. See Treaty of Amity, supra note 12, art. XXVII; see also supra notes 69–71 and 
accompanying text. 
 208. See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text. 
 209. ANNALS, supra note 1, at 617 (statement of Rep. Marshall on Mar. 7, 1800). 
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murder, Marshall reasoned.210  But Adams had advised Judge Bee to deliver 
Nash only “on such evidence as . . . would have been sufficient to have 
induced his commitment and trial for murder.”211  “Of consequence,” Marshall 
declared, “the decision of the President was so expressed as to exclude the case 
of an impressed American liberating himself by homicide.”212 
Marshall did not expressly connect these points with his affirmation that 
individual treaty rights fall within the province of the judiciary, not the 
Executive.  But in perhaps the most telling passage of the speech, Marshall 
acknowledged the executive power to act under the Treaty ultimately is subject 
to judicial review: “[I]f the President should cause to be arrested under the 
treaty an individual who was so circumstanced as not to be properly the object 
of such an arrest,” Marshall concluded, “he may perhaps bring the question of 
the legality of his arrest before a judge, by a writ of habeas corpus.”213 
D. Understanding the Nature of a Self-Executing Government Treaty Power 
The remainder of our examination of John Marshall’s speech will benefit 
from a summary of the analysis to this point.  First, as the political context 
might predict, Marshall focused his defense of President Adams on the specific 
treaty at issue.  His description of executive power thus had as its reference the 
specific circumstances of the treaty provision—or if one is generous, the type 
of treaty provision—at issue.  He also expressly excluded from executive 
authority those treaty rights that “are to be asserted or defended in court.”214  
And where the President initially acts in a way that may affect such rights, that 
executive action is subject to ultimate judicial review.  Finally, Marshall made 
clear that the executive power to execute a treaty by default only applies where 
the Legislature has not otherwise prescribed the mode or agency of doing so.  
Marshall, in short, did not assert a broad executive power even on the 
execution of all treaties. 
Why, then, has Marshall’s speech attracted so much attention from 
executive branch enthusiasts?  The reason most likely lies in the expansive 
rhetoric he employs to explain his narrower points.  As we turn to this rhetoric, 
we must again return to context.  A principal—perhaps the principal—legal 
charge against Adams was that he had improperly decided issues of law in the 
 
 210. Id. (“Had Thomas Nash been an impressed American, the homicide . . . would, most 
certainly, not have been a murder.”). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 615. 
 214. ANNALS, supra note 1, at 606 (statement of Rep. Marshall on Mar. 7, 1800). 
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extradition of Thomas Nash.215  In response, Marshall stated that “[a] variety 
of legal questions must present themselves in the performance of every part of 
Executive duty, but these questions are not therefore to be decided in court.”216  
Such was the case of Thomas Nash. 
Whether the case was within the Treaty (a “casus foederis”), Marshall 
stated, is indeed “a question of law, but of political law.”217  He then reasoned 
that such a question “depend[s] on principles never submitted to courts.”218  
This applies as well with reference to the judicial power of Article III, for “the 
Judicial power cannot extend to political compacts.”219  But, because the 
President is the “sole organ” in external relations and “possesses the whole 
Executive power,” and because “[t]he treaty . . . is a law,”220 he nonetheless 
has the power to “execute the contract by any means [he] possesses.”221 
These are strong words.  Plucked out of context, such a claim by a person 
who was to become perhaps the country’s most famous early Chief Justice 
would indeed lead one to think that something profound is at work. 
A more detached assessment reveals that the executive power Marshall is 
describing is not at all extraordinary.  By March of 1800, the Supreme Court 
and the Executive Branch had indeed confronted the effect of treaties on 
numerous occasions.  But as of this time, barely a decade after the Constitution 
came into effect, the Supreme Court had not yet analyzed in detail the broad 
implications of Article VI’s command that “all” treaties are the “Law of the 
Land.”222  Nonetheless, Marshall himself would reason three decades later, 
then as Chief Justice, that some treaties—those that are merely “executory” 
 
 215. See id. at 612 (noting that congressional opponents had “contended that this was a case 
proper for the decision of the courts, because points of law occurred, and points of law must have 
been decided in its determination”). 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 613 (stating that whether the case was within the Treaty “was a question of law, 
but no man could have hazarded the opinion that such a question must be carried into court, and 
can only be there decided”). 
 218. Id.; see also id. at 615 (concluding that “[i]t is . . . demonstrated, that, according to the 
principles of the American Government, the question whether the nation has or has not bound 
itself to deliver up any individual, charged with having committed murder or forgery within the 
jurisdiction of Britain, is a question the power to decide which rests alone with the Executive 
department”). 
 219. ANNALS, supra note 1, at 607 (statement of Rep. Marshall on Mar. 7, 1800). 
 220. Id. at 613. 
 221. Id. at 614. 
 222. U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
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rather than “executed”223—do not of their own force create immediately 
enforceable rights or obligations in domestic law.224 
To understand Marshall’s rhetoric of 1800 against this backdrop we must 
first recognize that he is describing two separate (although related) executive 
powers.  One is an external power of contact, the other a domestic power of 
action.  A proper understanding of this distinction requires that we pull apart 
the two issues and analyze them separately. 
1. The President as “Sole Representative” 
When carefully considered, John Marshall’s descriptions of the President 
as “sole organ” and “sole representative” in foreign affairs should be among 
the passages of least enduring constitutional significance.  What is commonly 
omitted in modern quotations is that the referent for these statements is formal 
communication by a foreign state directed at the United States.  The 
immediately succeeding sentence thus states, “Of consequence, the 
[extradition] demand of a foreign nation can only be made on him.”225  The 
same is true of the vehicle for delivery of the response.  Thus, Marshall stated 
in the next paragraph, because the President “possesses the whole Executive 
power[,] . . . any act to be performed by the force of the nation is to be 
performed through him.”226 
In this aspect of his speech, Marshall thus merely sketched out the concept 
that the President is the vehicle of formal communication with foreign states.  
This point comes out most clearly in his earlier public letter in the Virginia 
Federalist.227  Marshall again emphasized there that the Treaty “has not 
pointed out any mode” of execution; thus, “we must recur to principles and the 
nature of things . . . to discover it.”228  “Because the governments [are] the only 
channel of communication between the nations,” he reasoned, “the natural, and 
obvious and the proper mode is an application . . . to the executive of the 
nation to which [the person] has fled.”229  And as “a mere question of state,” 
 
 223. For an explanation of this terminological distinction, see David Sloss, When Do Treaties 
Create Individually Enforceable Rights? The Supreme Court Ducks the Issue in Hamdan and 
Sanchez-Llamas, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 20, 85–91 (2006). 
 224. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (“[W]hen the terms of [a treaty] 
stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the 
treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute 
the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.”). 
 225. ANNALS, supra note 1, at 613 (statement of Rep. Marshall on Mar. 7, 1800). 
 226. Id.  Marshall thus repeatedly refers to the formal relationship with the foreign power, 
both respecting “demand” and the “act of delivering up an individual.”  Id. at 608. 
 227. See Letter to the Virginia Federalist (Sept. 7, 1799), in MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 
136, at 23. 
 228. Id. at 25. 
 229. Id. 
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the application by Britain to deliver up a fugitive under the Treaty “would be 
to the executive and not to the judiciary, or any other inferior department of the 
government.”230 
At the time, this reasoning may have been of special value in laying out the 
implications from the President’s constitutional authority over ambassadorial 
relations.231  For modern sensibilities, however, the principle has long since 
entered the mainstream.  The formal status of the President as “the 
constitutional representative of the United States in its dealings with foreign 
nations”232 developed separately and without express reliance on Marshall’s 
speech.  It is now familiar ground.233 
In this respect, in short, Marshall’s “sole organ” observation merely stands 
for the unproblematic proposition that the President is the conduit for formal 
interaction with foreign states.234  For Marshall, this principle had immediate 
application in specific reference to the extradition Treaty with Great Britain.  
 
 230. Id. at 25–26. 
 231. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (providing that the President “shall nominate, and by and 
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers 
and Consuls”); id. art. II, § 3 (granting to the President the power to “receive Ambassadors and 
other public Ministers”).  Indeed, others had already advanced this proposition by that time.  On 
November 22, 1793, Jefferson wrote to the French Minister, Edmond Charles Genet, that the 
President was “the only channel of communication between this country and foreign nations, 
[and] it is from him alone that foreign nations or their agents are to learn what is or has been the 
will of the nation.”  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond Charles Genet (Nov. 22, 1793), in 
6 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 451 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s 
Sons 1895); see also Pacificus No. 7 (July 27, 1793), reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 130, 135 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1969) (observing that the President is 
“[t]he constitutional organ of intercourse between the U[nited] States & foreign Nations”).  A 
Senate Committee also agreed with the proposition in 1816.  See 8 COMPILATION OF REPORTS OF 
THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, 1789–1901, S. Doc. No. 56-
231, pt. 8, at 24 (1901) (“The President is the constitutional representative of the United States 
with regard to foreign nations.”). 
 232. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 35 (1960). 
 233. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (“[T]he historical 
gloss on the ‘executive Power’ vested in Article II of the Constitution has recognized the 
President’s ‘vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations.’” (quoting 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring))); see also First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 767 
(1972) (plurality opinion) (declaring that the President has “the lead role . . . in foreign policy”); 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (stating that “[i]n this vast 
external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President 
alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation”). 
 234. Thus, for example, the “sole organ” reference has had very little if anything to do with 
the substantive or jurisprudential reasons for any particular presidential power.  See Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 580–81 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that Marshall 
advanced his “sole organ” proposition “for the[] reasons” of the “structural advantages of a 
unitary Executive” in national security and foreign affairs). 
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Because the President is the formal representative of the United States in 
executing the Treaty in the external relations with Great Britain, Marshall 
reasoned that “any act to be performed by the force of the nation is to be 
performed through him.”235 
2. The President and the Exercise of a Self-Executing Government 
Power 
It is a common view that in his address of 1800 John Marshall was 
speaking solely of the President’s status as a medium of external 
communication.236  Careful consideration nonetheless reveals that Marshall 
had more to say than that.  For the speech also has a second, domestic law 
premise—thus far largely overlooked by scholars—that is substantially more 
subtle and relates to the creation of a government power by treaty. 
At its core, the dispute between the Republicans and Marshall—to the 
extent it was anything other than pure political posturing for the impending 
national elections237—was, to use modern terminology, over the issue of self-
execution.  The language of the 27th Article was not at all clear on this point: It 
provided merely that the parties “agreed” to extradite covered fugitives.238  The 
Republicans argued that, without an express “mode of performance,” the 
Treaty did not operate of itself—i.e., without legislative implementation—to 
create a domestic law power of extradition.239  The logical consequence for 
these opponents was that, given the absence of such legislation, President 
Adams lacked the authority to bring about the delivery of Nash/Robbins to the 
British.240 
Marshall’s speech, in contrast, simply proceeded on the premise that the 
extradition provision was—again in modern terms—self-executing.  In other 
 
 235. ANNALS, supra note 1, at 613 (statement of Rep. Marshall on Mar. 7, 1800). 
 236. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787–1984, at 208 
(Randall W. Bland et al. eds., 5th rev. ed. 1984) (“Clearly, what Marshall had foremost in mind 
was simply the President’s role as instrument of communication with other governments.”); KOH, 
supra note 39, at 81 (stating that Marshall’s speech was “uncontroversial . . . because [Congress] 
had largely acquiesced in the president’s narrower dominance over diplomatic communications”); 
LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 52 (1988) (asserting 
that Marshall’s sole organ statement “meant nothing more than that only the President 
communicates with foreign nations; he is the organ of communication”). 
 237. See supra Part II.B. 
 238. Treaty of Amity, supra note 12, art. XXVII (stating that “[i]t is further agreed, that His 
Majesty and the United States, on mutual requisitions, by them respectively, . . . will deliver up” 
the covered individuals). 
 239. ANNALS, supra note 1, at 614 (statement of Rep. Marshall on Mar. 7, 1800); see also 
Wedgwood, supra note 5, at 335–38 (examining the arguments of Republican Albert Gallatin). 
 240. See ANNALS, supra note 1, at 614 (statement of Rep. Marshall on Mar. 7, 1800) 
(describing the opposition argument that “although [extradition] should be properly an Executive 
duty, yet it cannot be performed until Congress shall direct the mode of performance”). 
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words, Marshall assumed, but did not analyze.  The only real information we 
have on Marshall’s thinking on this score comes from his open letter in the 
Virginia Federalist: The drafters of the Treaty must have intended direct 
enforcement, Marshall reasoned, for “it would be absurd to suppose the parties 
meant to stipulate for a thing which could not be performed.”241  On this 
assumption, Marshall’s examination of the President’s role in execution moves 
forward squarely on the foundation that the Treaty at issue “is a law.”242 
The next move is significant.  The Treaty, as we have seen, identified 
neither the mode nor the agency for execution, that is, for the formal decision 
to deliver an accused to Great Britain upon its request.243  The question that 
remained, therefore, was an interpretive one: Whom, as a matter of domestic 
authority, did the Treaty empower to carry out the “law” it established?  It is 
on this interpretive issue that Marshall’s discussion of the President’s role as 
external representative becomes relevant beyond the issue of mere 
communication with foreign states. 
Marshall first indicated that, because both the formal demand by and 
formal delivery to Great Britain is a matter of external relations, the national 
Executive—the “sole representative with foreign nations”244—might have to 
be involved in any event.245  He then paired this external role with the duty 
under the Take Care Clause246 to conclude that the President must have been 
the empowered domestic agency247 to enforce the treaty obligation as a 
domestic law matter as well.248  Indeed, lacking any other prescribed agency, 
 
 241. Letter to the Virginia Federalist (Sept. 7, 1799), in MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 136, 
at 23, 24 (“There must . . . have been some mode of carrying the provision of the treaty in this 
respect into execution, or else the articles would be nugatory; and it would be absurd to suppose 
the parties meant to stipulate for a thing which could not be performed.”). 
 242. ANNALS, supra note 1, at 613 (statement of Rep. Marshall on Mar. 7, 1800). 
 243. Id. at 614. 
 244. Id. at 613. 
 245. Id.  Moreover, to do otherwise could be dangerous to individuals and the state as a 
whole.  As Marshall stated in the Virginia Federalist letter, “a removal of any person . . . without 
an application to the chief magistrate would not only be dangerous to the personal safety of 
individuals, but would be an indignity and affront.”  Letter to the Virginia Federalist (Sept. 7, 
1799), in MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 136, at 23, 25. 
 246. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 247. The use of the passive is intentional here.  In his congressional speech, Marshall 
identifies neither the empowering authority nor the empowering mechanism.  In his Virginia 
Federalist letter, Marshall nonetheless “recur[red] to principles and the nature of things” and 
reasoned that, in absence of a prescribed mode, the President is the proper authority to execute the 
Treaty.  Letter to the Virginia Federalist (Sept. 7, 1799), in MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 136, 
at 23, 25. 
 248. See ANNALS, supra note 1, at 614 (statement of Rep. Marshall on Mar. 7, 1800) (“Ought 
not this person to perform the object, although the particular mode of using the means has not 
been prescribed?”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] TAKING CARE OF JOHN MARSHALL’S POLITICAL GHOST 131 
the President “alone” possessed the “means of executing” the specific treaty 
provision at issue there.249  This is, in short, inference by default.250 
The rub comes in Marshall’s description of the discretion that attends this 
default power of execution.  As we have seen, Marshall seems to say that the 
very question of whether the Treaty applies is one of “political law” of a sort 
that “depend[s] on principles never submitted to courts.”251 
The first important point on these seemingly provocative words is that 
Marshall himself is at turns unclear and contradictory.  To justify his claim of 
“political law” Marshall repeatedly referred to the “duty” to comply with Great 
Britain’s extradition request under the Treaty,252 a point made most clearly in 
his Virginia Federalist letter.253  Elsewhere in his Congressional speech, 
however, he suggested that the President may have the discretion to decide not 
to extradite even when the Treaty unmistakably applies.254 
But we must not be unduly harsh to Marshall on this score.  The 27th 
Article of the Treaty with Great Britain was the first true extradition agreement 
in our nation’s history.255  Indeed, formal extradition treaties of any kind were 
exceedingly rare throughout the world prior to the nineteenth century.256  
 
 249. Id. at 613. 
 250. With this power and duty, Marshall then reasons that President Adams was required to 
communicate his views on the extradition to Judge Bee.  As he explained in the Virginia 
Federalist, “it follows necessarily” that the President’s conveyance of the requisition by Great 
Britain under the Treaty “ought to have been accompanied with some expression of the will of 
Government upon the subject.”  Letter to the Virginia Federalist, in MARSHALL PAPERS, supra 
note 136, at 23, 26. 
 251. ANNALS, supra note 1, at 613 (statement of Rep. Marshall on Mar. 7, 1800). 
 252. See id. at 614 (asserting that although Congress “may prescribe the mode,” until it does 
so “it seems the duty of the Executive department to execute the contract by any means it 
possesses”). 
 253. See Letter to the Virginia Federalist (Sept. 7, 1799), in MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 
136, at 23, 24 (stating that the extraction provision “contain[s] an absolute engagement”); id. 
(“Nor can either nation refuse, for the words are positive.”); id. at 28 (concluding with the 
reasoning that “[u]pon the whole, the President appears to have done no more than his duty”). 
 254. See ANNALS, supra note 1, at 614–15 (statement of Rep. Marshall on Mar. 7, 1800) (“If, 
at any time, policy may temper the strict execution of the contract, where may that political 
discretion be placed so safely as in the department whose duty it is to understand precisely the 
state of political intercourse and connexion between the United States and foreign nations . . . ?”); 
see also Letter to the Virginia Federalist (Sept. 7, 1799), in MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 136, 
at 23, 26. 
 255. See Parry, supra note 103, at 108.  An earlier consular convention with France in 1788 
was limited to deserting sailors and expressly provided that extradition hearings would occur 
before “the courts, judges and officers competent” of each country.  See Convention Between His 
Most Christian Majesty and the United States of America, for the Purpose of Defining and 
Establishing the Functions and Privileges of their Respective Consuls and Vice-Consuls, U.S.-Fr., 
art. IX, Nov. 14, 1788, 8 Stat. 106. 
 256. See 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 950–51 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts 
eds., 9th ed. 1992). 
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Moreover, at the time of Marshall’s speech the background understanding of 
international law favored the absence of any general duty of extradition.257  In 
large measure, therefore, Marshall was writing on a blank slate on the 
respective roles of the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches in 
extradition matters, as well as on the interaction of international law obligation 
and domestic law action. 
In any event, Marshall’s assertions of “political law” do not reflect some 
grand theory of unbridled executive power.  What is at work here, rather, is a 
discretionary governmental power founded in law.  Marshall nowhere 
intimated that it is within the President’s constitutional warrant to extradite an 
individual to a foreign power on his own initiative; to the contrary, he 
repeatedly emphasized, as we have seen, that President Adams’s authority 
derived from the terms of a properly authorized and ratified treaty.258  The 
specific treaty provision Marshall addressed was “self-executing” in the sense 
that it created a domestic governmental power to act on an extradition request.  
Even this power, however, was subject to express limitations in the treaty (and 
of course other hierarchically superior legal principles259).  Marshall then 
reasoned by default that the possessor of that power to act—to formally 
execute the Treaty by delivering a fugitive to a foreign state—was the national 
Executive. 
Marshall of course did not use modern terminology to describe the power.  
But he did use two illustrations that should translate for the modern mind.  He 
first raised, as a parallel hypothetical, a demand for extradition made by the 
United States to Great Britain under the same Treaty.260  He unsurprisingly 
reasoned that, although such a demand would require that the Executive 
resolve issues of law under the Treaty, “no man would say it was a question 
which ought to be decided in the courts.”261  The decision to make an 
extradition request of Great Britain on the international law foundations of a 
treaty, in other words, was for the Executive, not the courts. 
Marshall separately drew an analogy to prosecutorial discretion.  “A 
private suit instituted by an individual, asserting his claim to property, can only 
be controlled by that individual,” he noted.262  “But a public prosecution 
carried on in the name of the United States can, without impropriety, be 
dismissed at the will of the Government.”263  Such a decision of its nature 
 
 257. Id. at 948–50. 
 258. See supra Part III.A. 
 259. Of course, even if properly approved by the Senate and ratified by the President, a treaty 
may not contravene the Constitution itself.  See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1957). 
 260. See ANNALS, supra note 1, at 613 (statement of Rep. Marshall on Mar. 7, 1800). 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 609. 
 263. Id.; see also id. at 615 (making the same point). 
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involves legal determinations by executive branch officials.  But even to this 
day, such exercises of prosecutorial discretion—except in the most extreme 
circumstances—do not require judicial intercession. 
It is not at all unusual or suspect for the Executive Branch to exercise 
discretionary powers that do not depend on advance judicial approval.  In 
addition to Marshall’s own citation of prosecutorial discretion, a prominent 
example of this is a matter committed by law to agency discretion.  As the 
Supreme Court declared in Heckler v. Chaney, “[t]his court has recognized on 
several occasions over many years that an agency’s decision not to prosecute 
or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally 
committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.”264 
It likewise is not at all uncommon—although the scholars have not focused 
substantial attention on this point—for treaties to delegate such a discretionary 
government power to act.  Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (of which nearly 
fifty exist) provide a good example.265  The purpose of these “MLATs” is to 
create a self-executing, though discretionary, power for executive branch 
agencies to assist foreign states through domestic investigatory powers.266  
Another example in the same vein is prisoner exchange treaties (which are in 
force in relation to nearly seventy countries).267 
Taken alone, we may fault Marshall’s free-flowing “political law” rhetoric 
for failing to appreciate the important distinction between a basic power to act 
and the legality of any particular exercise of that power with reference to other 
rights secured by law.  But again, we must resist the lawyer’s impulse to craft 
arguments on text detached from context.  Viewed in full perspective, 
Marshall’s reference to “political law” within the authority of the Executive 
merely reflects the point that the President’s default authority to execute the 
extradition Treaty did not—unlike modern practice—require advance judicial 
approval.268 
 
 264. 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (concluding that a refusal to investigate the use of drugs for 
lethal injections was within the FDA’s discretionary authority and not subject to judicial review). 
 265. See Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law in an Age of Treaties, 89 CORNELL 
L. REV. 892, 925–26 (2004) (canvassing these and similar self-executing treaties). 
 266. See, e.g., In re Comm’r’s Subpoenas, 325 F.3d 1287, 1290–91 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(describing the operation of such treaties). 
 267. Van Alstine, supra note 265, at 925. 
 268. This is consistent with the power of the political branches to act on deportation 
proceedings generally without advance judicial sanction.  See, e.g., Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 
524, 537 (1952) (“The power to expel aliens, being essentially a power of the political branches 
of government, . . . may be exercised entirely through executive officers, ‘with such opportunity 
for judicial review of their action as congress may see fit to authorize or permit.’” (quoting Fong 
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713–15, 728 (1893))); see also INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 
468 U.S. 1032 (1984). 
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Nonetheless, the procedure actually followed by President Adams and 
defended by John Marshall—feeling their way, as it were, through the early 
constitutional dark—does not differ in substance from present legal practice 
for extradition treaties (of which nearly 110 are in force for the United 
States269).  First, federal courts have consistently found that extradition treaties 
create a self-executing power to deliver fugitives to a foreign state.270  Recall 
also that President Adams merely offered his “advice and request” in a judicial 
proceeding already underway in federal court.271  Under modern practice, 
federal prosecutors likewise commonly initiate extradition proceedings in 
federal court at the behest of the requesting country.272  The assigned district 
judge then issues an arrest warrant and holds a hearing—to which the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure and Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply—on 
the sufficiency of the evidence as required by the underlying extradition 
treaty.273 
It is also “taken for granted” today that the President has the “ultimate” 
authority on whether to extradite the charged fugitive.274  Indeed, as the 
leading treatise on the subject has concluded, “United States jurisprudence 
reflects the view that an extradition treaty does not per se create an obligation 
to extradite.”275  Even under this approach that formally involves advance 
judicial engagement, the President retains the discretion not to extradite a 
requested fugitive.276 
To be sure, Marshall’s analysis in early 1800 contemplated that the 
Executive Branch would make its own legal determinations concerning 
whether a particular case satisfied the requirements set forth in the treaty.  But 
he also made clear that such legal determinations are not within the final 
authority of the President.  Indeed, Marshall emphasized toward the end of his 
famous speech that the execution of this “political law” is subject to judicial 
oversight.  Although the President may decide to act on the authority delegated 
by the extradition Treaty, Marshall declared, an affected individual may “bring 
 
 269. See Van Alstine, supra note 265, at 925. 
 270. See id. (citing cases). 
 271. See supra Part II.A. 
 272. See Parry, supra note 103, at 95. 
 273. See id. 
 274. Id. at 150. 
 275. M. Cherif Bassiouni, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND 
PRACTICE 150 (4th ed. 2002). 
 276. Strong reasons exist to question this jurisprudence, in that it represents a violation of the 
very international law obligations the treaty was designed to create.  See id. at 151 (concluding 
that “the United States’ view of the permissible scope of executive discretion conflicts with the 
obligations of the nation to perform its agreement in good faith”); see also David Sloss, Non-Self-
Executing Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 46–55 (2002) 
(arguing that an international law obligation under a treaty is also a domestic law obligation under 
the Supremacy Clause of Article VI). 
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the question of the legality of [the President’s action] before a judge” as an 
ultimate check on an executive power grounded in law.277 
CONCLUSION 
A lawyer’s recounting of legal history carries an inherent risk, to put the 
matter politely, of unintentional distortion.  The legal mind is schooled in 
argumentation, in seeking out support for a particular, often preassigned or 
predetermined position.  This risk of distorting an historical event through 
description only compounds with successive repetition. 
The analysis in this work reveals that, as a result of two centuries of telling 
and retelling (most notably by Justice Sutherland in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp.278), the story of John Marshall’s 1800 speech has strayed 
far from the original.  When properly situated in its political context, strong 
incentives pushed John Marshall to draw his description of executive power as 
narrowly as possible.  And a detached review of his speech in its entirety 
reveals that this in fact is what he did.  With a clear appreciation of the political 
backdrop to the attack on President (and candidate) John Adams, Marshall’s 
speech ultimately reflected only a defense of a specific presidential action in a 
specific dispute under a specific treaty. 
There is, in short, little extraordinary in John Marshall’s description of 
executive power in 1800.  The power he described was, first, derived from his 
own assumption that the specific treaty at issue created immediately 
enforceable domestic law.  In absence of an expressly prescribed mode or 
agency, Marshall simply reasoned that, by default, the President must have the 
power to execute the “law” the Treaty created.  For modern understandings, 
that this power involved an initial exercise of discretion by the Executive is not 
at all unusual.  Like a matter committed to agency discretion by Congress, a 
great number of modern treaties in fact create precisely the kind of domestic 
law power to act that Marshall addressed in 1800.  Ultimately, Marshall 
emphasized that any exercise of the delegated power by the Executive is 
subject to the final authority of the Judicial Branch, as he would famously 
declare only three years later, “to say what the law is.”279 
 
 277. ANNALS, supra note 1, at 615 (statement of Rep. Marshall on Mar. 7, 1800). 
 278. See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text. 
 279. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province 
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